Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 95

Issue 2

Article 1

12-2019

The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt
Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment
Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown University Law Center

Evan D. Bernick

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 499 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL201.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

7-JAN-20

14:29

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF
“PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES”
THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE,
ABRIDGED: A CRITIQUE OF KURT LASH ON
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Randy E. Barnett * & Evan D. Bernick **
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”1 Upon confronting
this language, the first question most ask is what exactly are the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States”? It was this very question that
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put to attorney Alan Gura during oral argument
in McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 as he was urging the Court to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the right to keep and bear arms.3 “But
I really would like you to answer the question that you didn’t have an opportunity to finish answering, and that is: What other . . . rights? What does the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship embrace?”4
On May 23, 1868, Jacob Howard, senator from Michigan, former attorney general of Michigan, and the designated sponsor of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Senate, delivered a comprehensive and widely reported
address in which he addressed this question.5 According to Howard, the
© 2019 Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law
Center; Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Diane S. Sykes, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
3 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–5, McDonald, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 081521).
4 Id. at 8.
5 HAMILTON GAY HOWARD, IN MEMORIAM: JACOB M. HOWARD OF MICHIGAN 1, 9 (1906).
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“privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens consisted of two categories of “fundamental guarantees.”6
In the first category were “the privileges and immunities spoken of in the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”7 Howard read a
very lengthy passage from Justice Washington’s opinion in the 1823 case of
Corfield v. Coryell,8 in which Washington defined the “privileges and immunities” protected by Article IV, Section 2, as rights “which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments;
and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”9
Washington went on to explain that privileges and immunities
may . . . be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection
by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.10

He then listed several “fundamental” rights that fell under these “general
heads,” some of which rights are “[un]enumerate[d],” in the sense that they
do not appear in the federal Constitution in itemized form—such as the
rights to travel and to be free from discriminatory taxation.11
After reading from Washington’s Corfield opinion, Howard identified a
second category of fundamental rights: “To these privileges and immunities,
whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their
entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the personal
6 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
7 Id. at 2765. The Privileges and Immunities Clause appears at U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 1.
8 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
9 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
10 Id. at 551–52. Washington was here reiterating the canonical formulation of natural rights that was originally drafted in 1776 by George Mason for the Virginia Declaration
of Rights:
THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among which are, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
See Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights and Edited by the Virginia Convention
(May 27, 1776), CONSOURCE (emphasis added), https://www.consource.org/document/
committee-draft-of-the-virginia-declaration-of-rights-and-edited-by-the-virginia-convention1776-5-27/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). Mason’s formulation was adopted by several states
for the declarations of rights in their own constitutions. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 33–40, 67
(2016). In Washington’s words, these rights were “deemed to be fundamental.” Corfield, 6
F. Cas. at 552.
11 See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52.
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rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution.”12
Then, after providing a list13 of enumerated personal rights, Howard
summarized his understanding of the two categories of “privileges or immunities”: “Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of
them secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I
have recited, some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .”14
Howard explained that an amendment was necessary to protect these
privileges and immunities because, at present, “[t]hey d[id] not operate in
the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition on State legislation.”15 So,
“[t]he great object of the first section of this amendment is . . . to restrain the
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these fundamental guarantees.”16
It would seem clear that Howard understood the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”17 to include (1) the set of unenumerated
rights that Corfield v. Coryell associated with the “privileges and immunities” of
Article IV, Section 2; and (2) the personal rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, and that none of the “fundamental
guarantees” in this “mass” may be abridged by states.18 This is the conventional way in which scholars have read Howard’s language.19
Howard’s role as spokesman for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
was a product of happenstance. William Pitt Fessenden, the chairman of the
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
13 Id. The list appears to be a partial one, as Howard prefaces it with the phrase “such
as.” Id. Howard omitted the rights of criminal defendants to confront witnesses, to have
compulsory processes for obtaining witnesses in their favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for their defense. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend VI. Howard’s list also did not
refer to what we call the Establishment Clause as any kind of right. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). Lash has claimed that, though
originally a federalism provision, by 1868, the Establishment Clause was thought to protect
an individual right, but Howard’s omission undermines this claim. See Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1085, 1154 (1995) (“By 1868, the (Non)Establishment Clause was understood to be
a liberty as fully capable of incorporation as any other provision in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.”).
14 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphases added).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 2766.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765–66 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
19 See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863–1869, at 108–09 (1990); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not? The Meaning of Privileges
and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1312 (2009); Christopher R. Green, Incorporation, Total Incorporation, and Nothing but Incorporation?, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 93,
108–09 (2015); Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 1, 21 (1998).
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committee, had been ill, and Howard spoke in his place.20 Indeed, Howard
had voted against the language that he was charged with explaining—he preferred language of an earlier draft that was more expansive in certain
respects and more narrow in others.21
Howard is difficult to pin down ideologically. Conventionally characterized as a “radical” because of his early and energetic support for black suffrage and his hard-line stance on the readmission of former Confederate
states into the Union, he nonetheless “had a deep respect for the structure of
federalism and was generally a stickler for constitutional regularity.”22
If Howard was a reluctant witness, however, there is no reason to doubt
that he was a reliable one. His interpretation of the committee’s handiwork
was not contested by any senator.23 Indeed, so associated did the Fourteenth
Amendment become with Howard’s interpretation of it in public discourse, it
was often referred to simply as the “Howard Amendment.”24
It would, therefore, take a very bold advocate to claim that the original
meaning of the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens did not “restrain
the power of the States” to abridge the unenumerated25 rights of citizens that
were listed by Washington and Howard or “compel [states] at all times to
20 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–65 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
21 See MALTZ, supra note 19, at 87, 88 tbl.6.2. That earlier draft, composed by former
Congressman Robert Dale Owen, prohibited “discrimination . . . as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK,
THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 296 (1914). This
language was narrower in that it prohibited only discrimination, not generally applicable
deprivations of civil rights, and thus would not protect white supporters of the Union
against Southern retaliation. It was broader in that the term “civil rights” may have been
fuzzier at the edges than “privileges or immunities.” Concerns that the phrase “civil rights”
might be used to secure voting rights, the right to sit on juries, schooling rights, and the
right to hold political office led to the phrase’s redaction from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
See MALTZ, supra note 19, at 67–69.
22 Earl M. Maltz, Radical Politics and Constitutional Theory: Senator Jacob M. Howard of
Michigan and the Problem of Reconstruction, MICH. HIST. REV., Spring 2006, at 19, 24–26, 31.
23 See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 90
(1908) (noting the amendment was “agreed to without a division”).
24 See id.
25 In one sense, Lash is indeed claiming that constitutionally unenumerated rights are
also protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Lash clearly believes that the Privileges and Immunities Clause confers a privilege against parochial discrimination with
respect to certain, textually unspecified fundamental rights that are among the “privileges
and immunities of citizens of the several states,” and that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause empowers the federal courts and Congress to prevent such discrimination. Are
those “rights” “enumerated” because “privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
states” is part of the constitutional text and they are among those privileges and immunities, or unenumerated because they are not specifically listed? Or are they unenumerated
because they are only protected against parochial discrimination? Really, on Lash’s
account, the Privileges and Immunities Clause enumerates a privilege to be free from parochial discrimination with respect to unenumerated rights.
With that being said, we think referring to Lash’s theory as an enumerated-rights-only
theory is useful. On Lash’s account, unenumerated rights are not secured against discrimi-
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respect these . . . guarantees.”26 Were this claim accurate, it would follow
either that Jacob Howard misunderstood the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, or that scholars have long misunderstood what Jacob Howard said
about the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Professor Kurt Lash is so bold. In a series of painstakingly researched
articles27 that have culminated in a book,28 Lash has proposed that the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects enumerated personal rights—and only enumerated personal rights.29 According to
Lash, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was, in
antebellum jurisprudence, understood to be a mere “Comity Clause” that
confers only a singular enumerated right of sojourning citizens of a given
state to be free from discrimination with respect to their fundamental civil
rights when traveling in another state.30 And it was this singular right to
which Howard was referring in his speech.
According to Lash, therefore, Howard’s two categories of “privileges or
immunities”—unenumerated and enumerated—receive two different levels
of protection against state abridgment. The enumerated rights listed in the
first eight amendments (and elsewhere) are protected absolutely.31 States
are free, however, to abridge the unenumerated privileges and immunities
identified by Justice Washington in Corfield, provided they do not discrimination outside of the context of comity or against generally applicable restrictions, whereas
enumerated rights are thus secured.
26 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
27 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges
and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010) [hereinafter Lash,
The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I]; Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011) [hereinafter Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Part II]; Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III: Andrew
Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275 (2013).
28 KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014).
29 Id. at xi (“[T]he original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause included
only those rights enumerated in the Constitution.”).
30 Id. at 158–59 (arguing that Howard’s view fit “with the antebellum understanding of
‘privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,’” according to which “citizens
of the United States had a right of equal access to a limited set of state-conferred rights
when traveling to a state other than their home state[s]”). On Lash’s account, “enumerated” rights also include the right to vote for federal representatives and the right to the
writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 148, 300.
31 Id. at 237. The “absolute” protection of a right is in contrast with a right solely
being protected from discrimination. So, for example, the absolute protection of the right
to keep and bear arms means that no one’s right to arms may be infringed, and neither
can that of the citizenry as a whole. A discrimination-only protection would allow the
entire population to be denied the right, so long as it was denied equally. As we explain
elsewhere, “absolute” protection does not mean that a right may not reasonably be regulated. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the
Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019).
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nate against out-of-staters when either extending or regulating the exercise
of those privileges and immunities.
Crucially, on Lash’s account, because the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV allowed states to enact laws that
discriminate with respect to the unenumerated rights of their own citizens, so
too does the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On Lash’s account, then, scholars are correct to concentrate their attention
on Howard’s explanation, as it provides “the most likely original meaning of
the text.”32 But, scholars have generally misunderstood that explanation.
This has not always been Lash’s view. Around the turn of the millennium, he expressed sympathy for the view that the Clause afforded absolute
protection to both enumerated and unenumerated rights.33 In 2009, he
announced that he was “no longer convinced” that Representative John Bingham of Ohio—the Clause’s principal framer—“read the Privileges or Immunities Clause to have nationalized more rights that [sic] those listed in the
first eight amendments.”34 Today, he holds that the Clause nationalized all
enumerated rights—not merely those in the first eight amendments—but
only enumerated rights.
As we will explain, the credibility of any proposed interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be measured, in part, by considering how well
it accounts for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This landmark legislation protected the unenumerated rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.”35
It is generally accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
constitutionalize these rights so they could not be repealed by a future Congress; to empower the federal courts to enforce these rights; and to empower
Congress to enact legislation designed to protect these rights. Indeed, in
1870, Congress reenacted the entire Civil Rights Act after adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment just to be sure.36
Lash’s constricted reading of “the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States” makes it hard for him to explain how the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered the federal government to protect unenumerated
rights and thus how it secured the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. The
1866 Act, after all, protected against far more than discrimination against
32 LASH, supra note 28, at 232.
33 See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The
Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 500 (1999) [hereinafter Lash, Two Movements]
(“Th[e] Clause seem[ed] tailor-made for the recognition of nontextual fundamental freedoms.”); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of
the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 466 (2001) (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause . . . likely was intended to protect common law economic rights, as well as
rights like freedom of speech and religion.”).
34 Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 460 (2009).
35 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
36 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (stating that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 “is hereby re-enacted”).
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citizens sojourning in another state—it guaranteed to all “citizens” the same
bundle of listed rights “as [are] enjoyed by white citizens,”37 full stop. The
Enforcement Act of 187038 reenacted the 1866 Act and guaranteed the equal
enjoyment of a slightly smaller bundle39 of rights to “all persons.”40 Unless
he wants to deny the constitutionality of this legislation, Lash must either (a)
identify an unenumerated right to be free from discrimination that citizens
can invoke against their own states, or (b) locate the power to enact such civil
rights legislation in some provision other than the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
Lash has struggled to do either. At different times, he has located the
authority to enact the Civil Rights Act in each of the four operative clauses of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Privileges or Immunities Clause
(2011),41 the Citizenship Clause (2014),42 the Equal Protection Clause
(2015),43 and, most recently, the Due Process of Law Clause (2018).44
37 Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
38 Enforcement Act of 1870, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. at 144.
39 The Enforcement Act omits the rights “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property.” See id. at § 16. We will discuss the significance of this
omission, which, as Lash observes, seems to have been a consequence of the shift from
“citizens” to “persons.” Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389,
1464–66 (2018) (acknowledging common-law distinction between the ways in which citizens and noncitizens could “hold” real property, but denying that it entails the conclusion
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s protection for property holding does not “protect[ ] a natural right of all persons”).
40 Compare Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. at 27, with Enforcement Act of 1870,
§ 16, 16 Stat. at 144.
41 Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II, supra note 27, at 407.
“[E]nsuring that Congress had such power to enforce the equality principles of Article IV
(and thus authorize the Civil Rights Act) was one of the concerns driving the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. John Bingham “also wanted to protect the substantive
rights listed in the first eight amendments.” Id. Further, “[b]oth goals could be accomplished through an amendment which protected both the equality provisions of Article IV
and the substantive liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights.” Id. Lash’s discussion of
Howard’s reference to the “the entire mass of rights, privileges, and immunities found in
Article IV and the Bill of Rights” two paragraphs prior, which reference Lash rightly treats
as a part of an exposition of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, makes plain Lash’s belief
that the means through which these goals were accomplished was the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id.
42 See LASH, supra note 28, at 171 (“[The Citizenship Clause is] the text that constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
43 See Kurt T. Lash, Root Digs a Deeper Hole: The Equal Protection of Economic Privileges and
Immunities, LAW & LIBERTY (July 15, 2015), https://www.lawliberty.org/2015/07/21/equality-and-the-civil-rights-act-of-1866-a-final-response-to-damon-root/ (arguing that “Bingham
refused to support the Civil Rights Act because: 1) he believed Congress needed an amendment granting them power to pass such an act, and 2) he believed that all persons should
enjoy the equal protection of the law, not just citizens”; and stating that “Bingham’s final
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment fixed both problems by including an equal protection
clause that protected all persons”).
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In earlier writings, both of us45 have expressed sympathy for the view
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause affords absolute protection to
unenumerated rights, such as those contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and authorizes Congress to enact protective legislation.46 Neither of us, however, has engaged with Lash’s most recent and unique two-class interpretation of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
depth that it deserves. Nor have we evaluated his recent efforts to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause empowers the federal courts and Congress to protect unenumerated rights like the
right to make contracts, among others listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.47
In this Article, we will do so.
44 See Lash, supra note 39, at 1459 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment carried a meaning that both critics and supporters would have recognized as
authorizing legislation like the Civil Rights Act.”).
45 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 60, 194 (2004); Evan Bernick, Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment Protects Unenumerated
Rights: A Response to Kurt Lash, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/yes-the-fourteenth-amendm_b_7787926.
46 For example, in an 1872 speech, Senator John Sherman of Ohio supported the
constitutionality of what would eventually become the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by linking
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the rights affirmed as “others retained by the people” in the Ninth Amendment.
[T]he ordinary rights of citizenship, which no law has ever attempted to define
exactly, the privileges, immunities, and rights, (because I do not distinguish
between them, and cannot do it,) of citizens of the United States . . . our fathers
did not attempt to enumerate. They expressly said in the ninth amendment that
they would not attempt to enumerate these rights; they were innumerable,
depending upon the laws and the courts as from time to time administered.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
Those “innumerable” rights to which the Ninth Amendment refers include the individual natural rights that “make it possible for each person to pursue happiness while living
in close proximity to others and for civil societies to achieve peace and prosperity.” BARNETT, supra note 45, at 4; see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A
Response to A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937
(2008); Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2006). Lash agrees, although he argues as well that, in addition to individual natural
rights, the “rights . . . retained by the people” also include a collective right of the people to
self-governance. Kurt L. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 895, 910, 912 (2008).
That the courts and Congress must protect these rights does not tell us how they are to
do so. In other work, we have maintained that this is done, not by defining and enforcing
the rights themselves, but in defining and limiting the scope of governmental power. See
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 31. But this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, in
which we are solely concerned with the original meaning of the text of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Getting that meaning right is simply the first step; giving that meaning
legal effect is the second.
47 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27. Compare Lash, supra note 46, at
927 n.120 (describing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) as
having rejected “the unenumerated right to contract” (emphasis added)), with Lash, supra
note 39, at 1440–41 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protected the right to
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We will contend that Lash has provided readers with an abridged version
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In future writing, we will advance a
competing account of the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We will also develop a framework that can be used by judges
and legislators to identify the rights protected by the Clause, to thwart state
abridgments of those rights, and to evaluate congressional legislation that is
purportedly designed to protect those rights.
Part I provides an exposition of Lash’s thesis.48 Because his arguments
are complex, and rely on diverse evidence, our summary is lengthy. Given
the multiplicity of his publications on the subject, we think an accurate summary of Lash’s approach is both independently worthwhile and a necessary
prelude to any critique.
Part II systematically critiques Lash’s evidence and arguments. We find
that Lash’s enumerated-rights-only—or “ERO”—theory has little support in
antebellum jurisprudence; that the evidence Lash offers to show that John
Bingham, upon whose testimony Lash heavily relies, held Lash’s ERO theory
is equivocal at best; and that Lash’s ERO theory was not widely shared by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s framers. We then explain why evidence from the
debate over ratification does not indicate that the ERO theory was embraced
by the public.49
Next, we canvass postratification jurisprudence and congressional
debates over various pieces of civil rights legislation both prior to and shortly
after the Supreme Court’s fateful decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases50 and
United States v. Cruikshank51—decisions that are generally regarded as having
rendered the Privileges or Immunities a “practical nullity.”52 We find that
the interpretations of the Clause that are contained in these materials are,
for the most part, inconsistent with Lash’s ERO theory.
“make and enforce contracts,” “constituted an effort to enforce the enumerated due process
rights of national citizenship, not the unenumerated civil rights of state citizenship”
(emphasis added)).
48 We follow the plan of Lash’s book for ease of exposition, with one exception. What
Lash labels as Bingham’s “second” draft of Section 1, we call his “third.”
49 We will refer to “Lash’s ERO theory” rather than “the ERO theory” to emphasize
that Lash’s theory is but one of several possible theories according to which only enumerated rights are absolutely protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For instance,
Justice Hugo Black famously argued that only the personal rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments are absolutely protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Black
presented his view in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 215–31
(1998) (defending “refined . . . incorporation” of the Bill of Rights, pursuant to which
judges should ask whether an enumerated right “is a personal privilege—that is, a private
right—of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or the public at large” before
identifying it as a privilege or immunity of citizenship).
50 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
51 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
52 LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 82-170, at 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed.,
1953).
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Finally, we engage and respond to Lash’s argument that the political
dynamics during the relevant time period made it impossible for any constitutional amendment that delegated to Congress and the federal courts the
power to enforce unenumerated rights to be ratified.
Part III concludes.
I. LASH’S THESIS
A. Public Meaning Originalism and Terms of Art
Our evaluation of Lash’s originalist arguments is made easier by the fact
that we share his originalist interpretative commitments. In the preface to
his book, Lash summarizes those commitments:
The goal of this book is to illuminate the original public meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I define
“original meaning” as the likely original understanding of the text at the
time of its adoption by competent speakers of the English language who
were aware of the context in which the text was communicated for ratification. Determining original meaning requires investigating historical events
and texts antecedent to the proposed amendment in order to understand
the full historical context in which a proposed text is debated and ratified.
This is not an effort to discover the “true” or even “best” meaning of antecedent events and texts. Instead the goal is to recover how these legal antecedents were broadly understood, correctly or not, at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.53

Lash’s claim that widely held understandings of “legal antecedents”
informed the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
might seem counterintuitive. If Lash is concerned with public meaning, of
what epistemic value are legal antecedents with which few members of the
public might be familiar?
Consider the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10.54 Scholars
generally agree that the term “ex post facto laws” is a term of art—a phrase
that was not part of ordinary discourse but that carried a particular meaning
in legal settings in 1788.55 During the ratification debates, however, the Constitution’s supporters provided public explanations of the meaning of the
term and repeatedly emphasized that, because ex post facto laws were criminal in nature, the Ex Post Facto Clause would not prevent state legislatures
from adopting retroactive civil legislation.56 Through such public explana53 LASH, supra note 28, at xiv (footnote omitted).
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
55 See Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39 IDAHO L. REV.
489, 501–04 (2003) (tracing the term through Roman jurisprudence through the common
law to the debate over ratification). We do not endorse this interpretation, but merely
report it.
56 See id. at 517–22 (adducing evidence that “the majority of federalists addressing the
issue treated ex post facto laws as criminal only” during the ratification debate and that this
turned out to be “wise politically”).
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tions, terms that might otherwise be unintelligible to members of the public
who lack antecedent legal knowledge can become associated with particular
concepts.
More subtly, the concepts associated with legal terms of art may inform
public meaning solely by means of deference on the part of laypeople to
people with specialized legal knowledge.57 Ordinary citizens might be prepared to support the ratification of a word or phrase into law, knowing that its
meaning had previously been established in legal settings and that that meaning would bind the public upon ratification. If one has a high level of trust in
the framers of a document, agrees with the terms that one does understand,
and regards the status quo as intolerable, it may be reasonable to defer one’s
understanding to others in this way.
Showing that a division of linguistic labor has operated in either of these
ways, however, is no easy task. To make credible his case that technical “legal
antecedents” contributed to the original public meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Lash must establish both (a) that these legal understandings were widely accepted and (b) either that these understandings were
communicated to the public, or that the public deferred to the understanding of those who were legally trained.
With these methodological preliminaries out of the way, we begin by
summarizing Lash’s attempt to make out this claim.
B. “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the Several States” as a Term of Art:
Bingham’s First Two Drafts
Lash begins by parsing antebellum jurisprudence concerning the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.58 He draws an initial distinction
between use of the single terms “privileges” and “immunities”—terms that he
finds “in an almost bewildering array of contexts”—and use of the phrase
“privileges and immunities”—which he finds was “generally reserved to a
description of specially conferred rights” rather than “natural rights belonging
to all people or all institutions.”59
It is worth pausing to note that the choice between conceiving of privileges and immunities as specially conferred rights, on the one hand, or natural rights, on the other, might not be as sharp as Lash makes it out to be.
Professor Eric Claeys has stressed the influence in pre–Civil War America of
Sir William Blackstone’s conception of privileges and immunities as the positive law protections that civil society affords to the natural rights of its own
citizens.
57 As Professor Lawrence Solum has put it, an ordinary citizen might read a phrase like
ex post facto laws and think, “Hmm. I wonder what that means. It sounds like technical
legal language to me. If I want to know what it means, I should probably ask a lawyer.”
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 22, 25 (2008).
58 LASH, supra note 28, at 14; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
59 LASH, supra note 28, at 20.
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As Claeys explains, in Blackstone’s Commentaries on American Law, “ ‘civil
privileges’ refer to entitlements that replicate in positive law the general substance of natural rights. ‘Private immunities’ refer to the domains of noninterference English subjects enjoy as residual rights to do that which is not
prohibited by particular civil laws.”60
Claeys stresses the need for Fourteenth Amendment scholars to determine how “privileges” and “immunities” were “understood in context as
terms of art for the civil rights citizens were entitled to enjoy in a republican
political community”61 and presents evidence that “an understanding substantially similar to Blackstone’s” was assumed throughout “the United States’
colonial period, founding, and Reconstruction periods.”62
Lash then investigates antebellum caselaw and commentaries on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.63 His discussion of Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell—which, as we have noted, played an
important role during the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment64—warrants particular attention. Because it played so prominent a role in contemporary discussions of the meaning of “privileges or immunities,” Justice
Washington’s discussion of the meaning of “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” in Article IV is worth quoting at length:
60 Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United
States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 792 (2008)
(emphases added).
61 Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 820. Although Claeys does not study the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment in any great depth and thus does not reach a firm conclusion concerning the contribution of Blackstone’s definition of civil rights to the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, he notes Senator Lyman Trumbull’s use, in a floor speech supporting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, of Blackstone’s definition of civil liberty as “no other than natural
liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient for
the general advantage of the public.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (quoting, with minor variations, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *121); see Claeys, supra note 60, at 797–98. We would add as well that
Trumbull invoked Blackstone’s definition a second time to describe “rights belonging to
the citizen,” id. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Trumbull), that Senator Richard Yates used
Blackstone to define a “civil right” as “a limitation or extension of the natural right as is
conferred by statute,” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 101 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Yates), that John Bingham drew upon Blackstone in arguing that there was no “colorable distinction” between “civil rights” and “political rights,” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1291 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham), and that Representative James Wilson
drew upon Blackstone for “[t]he great fundamental rights [that] are the inalienable possession of both Englishmen and Americans,” id. at 1118 (statement of Rep. Wilson). All of
this suggests that Blackstone’s definition of civil rights was “in the air” during the framing
period. We will investigate the question of its influence in greater depth in our future
work.
63 LASH, supra note 28, at 9.
64 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (citing Washington’s opinion in Corfield with approval); id. at 1835 (statement of Rep.
Lawrence); id. at 1118 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Trumbull);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 293 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
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The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government;
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of
the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might
be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities . . . .65

Lash argues that Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion was intended to
communicate a comity-only view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause—
one that required states “to grant [sojourning] citizens of other states some of
the same privileges and immunities that the state conferred on its own citizens”66—and was understood to do so by legally educated readers. From his
survey of antebellum cases and commentaries on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Lash discerns “five possible approaches to Article IV, with one
quickly emerging as the dominant interpretation.”67 The dominant interpretation, he argues, was that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was a “Comity Clause.”68
65 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
66 LASH, supra note 28, at 23.
67 Id. at 22.
68 See, e.g., id. at x, 20, 47. We decline to adopt the term “Comity Clause,” despite the
cumbersomeness of referring continuously to the “Privileges and Immunities Clause.”
Labeling Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 a “Comity Clause” threatens to bias evaluation of
the evidence concerning how the Clause was understood by the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Lash recognizes, even if the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was understood in 1788 to protect only comity rights, the relevant questions where the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is concerned do not involve
whether the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 1 correctly but, rather, how they did in fact understand it and whether
they understood Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate that understanding. Id. at xiv.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL201.txt

512

unknown

Seq: 14

notre dame law review

7-JAN-20

14:29

[vol. 95:2

What has antebellum Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence to do
with the Privileges or Immunities Clause? The answer given by most scholars
is that the wording of the latter Clause was modeled on the language of the
former. For this reason, understanding the substantive rights protected
(from discrimination) by the former ought to help us understand the substantive rights protected (absolutely) by the latter.69 If any rights are absolutely protected by the latter, they ought to bear a substantial resemblance to
the rights of sojourning citizens of other states that are protected by the former against parochial discrimination.70
Lash challenges this consensus. He advances the novel claim that the
language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is “not based on the language of Article IV” because of conflicts that emerged in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress over one of Representative John Bingham’s initial drafts of the
Clause—a draft that was based on the language of Article IV, Section 2.71
On December 6, 1865, Bingham proposed the following amendment to
the Constitution: “Congress [shall have power] to pass all necessary and
proper laws to secure to all persons in every State of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and property . . . .”72 After detailing systematic state violations of “the absolute guarantees of the Constitution,”
Bingham referred his fellow representatives to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and provided the following interpretation of its meaning:
[G]o read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: “The citizens of
each State (being ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis “of the
United States”) in the several States.” This guarantee is of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in, not of, the several States.” This
guarantee of your Constitution applies to every citizen of every State of the
Union; there is not a guarantee more sacred, and none more vital in that
great instrument.73

Rights of American citizens “in” the several states connoted the fundamental preexisting rights of U.S. citizens that traveled with them; rights “of”
69 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 49, at 177–79; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 208–09
(2011); BARNETT, supra note 45, at 208–09; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114–15 (1986); MALTZ,
supra note 19, at 106–07; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 69 (1993); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 61, 132–34 (2011).
70 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 49, at 177–79; BALKIN, supra note 69, at 208–09; BARNETT,
supra note 45, at 208–09; CURTIS, supra note 69, at 114–15; MALTZ, supra note 19, at
106–08; Aynes, supra note 69, at 69; Hamburger, supra note 69, at 132–34.
71 LASH, supra note 28, at xi (emphasis added).
72 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). This proposed amendment was
introduced to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction on January 16. KENDRICK, supra
note 21, at 49, 51.
73 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
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the several states connoted state-conferred rights.74 That Bingham understood the fundamental rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to include rights set forth in the 1789 amendments can be seen in
Bingham’s express reference to rights secured by the Fifth Amendment as
being among the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States”75 in prior speeches and in the subsequent evolution of the text of his
proposed amendment.
Bingham’s first draft amendment was submitted to the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, of which he was a member. On February 10, 1866, Bingham offered to substitute the following language:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property (5th
amendment).76

One can see how this second draft began to track the two categories of
rights identified by Jacob Howard in his May 23 speech, although Bingham is
obviously here limiting himself to expressly protecting a portion of just one
of the first eight amendments. That same day, the committee adopted the
new language and returned it for congressional consideration and debate.
On February 26, Bingham explained that his second draft was designed
to enforce existing constitutional guarantees that were not being honored by
ex-Confederate states rather than to impose new limits on state power. Here
is Bingham:
[T]he amendment proposed stands in the very words of the Constitution of
the United States as it came to us from the hands of its illustrious framers.
Every word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our
country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of the United States. The residue of the resolution, as the House will
see by a reference to the Constitution, is the language of the second section of the
fourth article, and of a portion of the fifth amendment adopted by the First Congress in 1789 and made part of the Constitution of the country. . . .
....
. . . [I]t has been the want of the Republic that there was not an express
grant of power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State,
74 We will confront the textual distinction between “in” and “of” again when considering an alternative to the Fourteenth Amendment proposed by President Andrew Johnson.
See infra text accompanying notes 413–17.
75 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (listing
“the rights of life and liberty and property, and their due protection in the enjoyment
thereof by law” among “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”); see
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (stating that
“[t]he great privilege and immunity of . . . American citizen[s] to be respected everywhere
in this land . . . is that they shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law”).
76 KENDRICK, supra note 21, at 61.
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by congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of
the Constitution. . . .
....
. . . The House knows, sir, the country knows, the civilized world knows,
that the legislative, executive, and judicial officers of eleven States within this
Union within the last five years, in utter disregard of these injunctions . . .
have violated in every sense of the word these provisions of the Constitution
of the United States, the enforcement of which are absolutely essential to
American nationality.77

Lash infers from this explanation that Bingham believed tracking existing
constitutional language was “an important selling point to the moderates in
the Thirty-Ninth Congress.”78 However, Lash also finds that Bingham’s
efforts to forge consensus were unsuccessful.
Democrats, encouraged by the recent Republican failure to override
President Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, attacked
Bingham’s amendment as too great an intrusion upon states’ reserved powers.79 Lash reads some Republicans as responding by echoing Bingham’s
claim that the proposed amendment did nothing more than to enforce the
Privileges and Immunities Clause but averring that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protected only the rights of sojourning out-of-staters.80
Conservative Republican Robert Hale of New York, in a lengthy speech
that would be reprinted in full by the New York Times, expressed concern that
the proposed amendment was a “grant of power in general terms . . . to
legislate for the protection of life, liberty, and property, simply qualified with
the condition that it shall be equal legislation.”81 Hale went on to argue that
since the “bill of rights”—which he took to encompass all of the 1789 amendments, including the Ninth and Tenth—already “limit[ed] the power of Federal and State legislation,”82 Bingham’s proposed amendment was
unnecessary and would serve only as an invitation to Congress and the courts
to—as the Times summarized—“utterly obliterate State rights and State
authority over their own internal affairs.”83
According to Lash, Bingham thus had to clarify that his amendment was
broader in scope than certain of his supporters maintained while alleviating
fears that it was so broad as to reduce the federalist system to rubble. On
February 28, Bingham elaborated further the constitutional theory behind
his proposed amendment. This time, he explained why the Supreme Court’s
decision in Barron—contra Hale—made an amendment to provide for such
enforcement necessary:
77 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphases added).
78 LASH, supra note 28, at 91.
79 Id. at 97.
80 Id. at 98–99.
81 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale).
82 Id.
83 Debate in the Senate on the Concurrent Resolutions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1866, at 1.
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Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; but they say, “We are
opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress under an amended Constitution as proposed.” . . .
....
. . . A gentleman on the other side interrupted me and wanted to know
if I could cite a decision showing that the power of the Federal Government
to enforce in the United States courts the bill of rights . . . had been denied.
I answered that I was prepared to introduce such decisions; and that is
exactly what makes plain the necessity of adopting this amendment.
. . . I refer the House and the country to a decision of the Supreme
Court, to be found in 7 Peters, 247, in the case of Barron [v.] The Mayor and
City of Council of Baltimore . . . .84

Note that Bingham’s “bill of rights” included both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which—as we have seen—he understood to absolutely protect certain
national rights. This was not an idiosyncratic confusion on Bingham’s part.
It arose from the fact that the first ten (or eight) amendments were not commonly called “the Bill of Rights” until the twentieth century.85
As Lash points out, the success of Bingham’s needle-threading efforts
depended upon widespread acceptance of his premise that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV already required states to comply with his
understanding of the “bill of rights.” Lash argues that this premise was not
widely accepted. In particular, Lash claims that it was vigorously and successfully attacked by Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York in an influential
speech.
Hotchkiss made plain his “desire to secure every privilege and every
right to every citizen in the United States that [Bingham] desires to
secure.”86 He argued, however, that Bingham’s amendment failed to “provide that no State shall discriminate between its citizens and give one class of
citizens greater rights than it confers upon another.”87
Lash understands Hotchkiss to have argued that Bingham’s language
would likely be taken to protect only the rights of sojourning out-of-staters—
that is, comity rights—and to have urged that the language should be made
more “plain” in order to ensure absolute protection for national rights.88
After what Lash deems an unsuccessful effort on Bingham’s part to defend
his proposed language, Hotchkiss held forth about the importance of clearly
84 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
85 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF
RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2018).
86 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
87 Id.
88 See LASH, supra note 28, at 111.
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establishing “a constitutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of
citizens, or from the citizens of any State by mere legislation.”89
On Lash’s account, Bingham at this point recognized that no proposed
amendment that tracked the language of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause was likely either to be ratified or to be generally understood to protect
more than comity rights and so chose to “go back to the drawing board.”90
When he did, he looked for other language that would attract less opposition
and better suit his bill-of-rights-protective purposes. Lash believes that Bingham found that language in the message President Johnson delivered when
vetoing the Civil Rights Act of 1866.91
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 began by declaring “all persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are . . . citizens of the United States.”92 President Johnson recognized
that the Act directly conferred rights of federal citizenship upon people who
had previously been denied those rights rather than altering state citizenship
or rights that attached to state citizenship. He posed the following rhetorical
question: “Can it be reasonably supposed that [people previously excluded
from national citizenship] possess the requisite qualifications to entitle them
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States?”93
Lash hypothesizes that Johnson made a distinctive—and certainly unintended—contribution to the amendment project in which Bingham was
mired by distinguishing between rights protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.”94 In Lash’s telling, Bingham used this locution to achieve the end
for which the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause proved
unsuited—the communication of a concept of protected national rights that
was neither too narrow to achieve enumerated-rights enforcement nor too
broad to avoid an intracongressional veto by moderate and conservative
Republicans.
C. “Privileges or Immunities of the Citizens of the United States” as a Term of
Art: Bingham’s Third and Final Draft 95
Lash’s most novel contribution to the body of scholarship on the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the product of his exploration of evidence con89 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
90 LASH, supra note 28, at 109.
91 Id. at 102.
92 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
93 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866) (veto message from President
Johnson).
94 See LASH, supra note 28, at 140 (crediting Johnson with “introduc[ing] the language
of the rights of national citizenship into the legislative and public debate”). This is sheer
speculation. Lash offers no direct evidence that Bingham actually took inspiration from
Johnson’s language.
95 Lash discusses the two versions of Bingham’s proposed amendment that we
examined in the previous Section: the version proposed to the Joint Committee on January
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cerning the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” from
what seems at first to be an unlikely source: antebellum treaty jurisprudence.96 Lash begins with Article III of the Louisiana Cession Act of 1803
(“Cession Act”).97
Article III promised the inhabitants of territory purchased from France
that they would enjoy “all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of
the United States” upon being fully admitted into the Union.98 This language, Lash argues, was “the common language of contemporary international treaties, and . . . clearly influenced later American treaties involving
territorial cession” through Reconstruction.99
To explain its meaning, Lash focuses on “[o]ne of the most extensive
antebellum discussions involving the privileges and immunities of US citizens”—the debate produced by what were ultimately unsuccessful congressional efforts to secure a ban on slavery as a condition of admitting Missouri
into the Union.100 Opponents urged that such a ban would deny citizens of
Missouri “the rights, advantages, and immunities of other citizens of the
Union” recognized in the Cession Act.101 Free-state advocates argued
otherwise.102
Lash devotes particular attention to the free-state advocacy of Senators
Daniel Webster and David Morril of New Hampshire, both of whom distinguished the privileges and immunities of national citizenship from the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. Lash writes that, although Webster
and Morril provided “slightly different” lists of national rights, “[n]either list
16 and the version that he moved to substitute on February 3. Id. at 84. But for reasons he
does not provide, he labels the third and final version that Bingham proposed to the
Committee on Reconstruction on April 21, 1866, as his “second draft.” Id. at 145. The
latter was identical to the final amendment, save for the absence of the Citizenship Clause,
which would be proposed by Jacob Howard on May 30 and adopted on the same day.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866). Because we think this necessarily imports
confusion into a discussion of three of Bingham’s distinct formulations, we do not adopt
Lash’s terminology. We instead refer to the April 21st version as his “third draft” or as the
“final version.”
96 LASH, supra note 28, at 9. Lash is not the first to explore the relevance of this
evidence to the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For what appears
to be the earliest exploration of this evidence, see Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People: A Disjunctive Theory of Selective Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 765, 783–80 (1985). As the title reflects, Guminski reaches
different conclusions.
97 LASH, supra note 28, at 48; see also Treaty Between the United States of America and
the French Republic, Fr.-U.S., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200, 202.
98 Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, supra note
97, at 202.
99 LASH, supra note 28, at 49 (footnote omitted).
100 Id. at 52.
101 Id. at 53.
102 DANIEL WEBSTER ET AL., A MEMORIAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
THE SUBJECT OF RESTRAINING THE INCREASE OF SLAVERY IN NEW STATES TO BE ADMITTED INTO
THE UNION 15–16 (Boston, Sewell Phelps 1819).
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included any natural or common law liberties beyond those listed in the Federal Constitution, much less rights or immunities derived from state law.”103
Rather, they included only constitutionally enumerated rights.
Lash also finds that some free-state advocates associated the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship with the “rights, advantages, and
immunities” of the Cession Act and the privileges and immunities of state
citizenship with the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Webster maintained
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only “secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the State to which he
removes,” not “all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of every other
State, at the same time and under all circumstances.”104 For that reason,
Webster argued, “the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the
Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher, or
more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio” to force slavery into other
states, even though they were entitled under the Cession Act to the enjoyment of enumerated federal constitutional rights.105
Lash points out that certain of these free-state arguments were republished multiple times, including three years before the Civil War.106 One way
or the other, Lash contends that they came to the attention of John Bingham
and “inform[ed] [his] final draft of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”107
Precisely how Bingham happened to conclude that the language of privileges and immunities “of citizens of the United States” would serve his
desired ends is not clear on Lash’s account. Nor does Lash adduce any evidence from antebellum jurisprudence in support of the free-state, ERO theory’s influence following the admission of Missouri as a slave state—despite
his reliance upon antebellum jurisprudence when discussing how Republicans understood the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
On April 21, 1866, Bingham proposed that the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction add the following language to the emerging Fourteenth
Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.108

The language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was now gone,
replaced with that of “citizens of the United States.” After this language was
approved ten to three by the Joint Committee following a frankly dizzying
series of votes,109 Bingham introduced the proposed amendment to the
103 LASH, supra note 28, at 57–58.
104 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 102, at 16.
105 Id. at 17.
106 LASH, supra note 28, at 60–61.
107 Id. at 61.
108 KENDRICK, supra note 21, at 87.
109 The votes are tabulated and summarized in MALTZ, supra note 19, at 87–92.
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House on May 10.110 He stated that it would “protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”111 He then
added that in doing so it “t[ook] from no State any right that ever pertained
to it.”112
Bingham went on to describe “flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government
furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever,” such as the infliction of “ ‘cruel and unusual punishment[ ]’ . . . not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done.”113 He drew attention to a South Carolina law
that required “citizens of the United States as well, should abjure their allegiance to every other government or authority than that of the State of South
Carolina.”114 It was, said Bingham,
an opprobrium to the Republic that for fidelity to the United States they
could not by national law be protected against the degrading punishment
inflicted on slaves and felons by State law. That great want of the citizen and
stranger, protection by national law from unconstitutional State enactments,
is supplied by the first section of this amendment. That is the extent it hath, no
more . . . .115

Lash interprets Bingham’s statement that the proposed amendment did
“no more” than to protect “citizen and stranger . . . from unconstitutional
state enactments” to reflect a “moderate position that the states remained an
important constituent part of American constitutional government.”116
Bingham stressed that Congress’s power to protect privileges and immunities
did not encompass the “regulat[ion] [of] suffrage in the several States” and
insisted that his amendment supplied power to enforce existing constitutional obligations, as much as certain of his radical colleagues might have
wanted to—in Lash’s words—“nationalize[ ] the subject of civil rights and
place[ ] the entire matter under federal control.”117
Lash then confronts “[p]robably the most studied speech of the ThirtyNinth Congress regarding the Fourteenth Amendment”—Jacob Howard’s
introduction of the proposed amendment to the full Senate on May 23.118
As we saw in the Introduction, Howard cited with approval Justice Washington’s exposition in Corfield of “the character of the privileges and immunities
110 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2543 (emphasis added).
116 LASH, supra note 28, at 151–52.
117 Id. at 150, 153 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)).
118 Id. at 155.
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spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”119
Howard then added, “[t]o these privileges and immunities, whatever they
may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent
and precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied
and secured by the first . . . amendments of the Constitution.”120
After providing a partial list of those personal rights, Howard recapitulated his understanding of the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause: “Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of
them secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution,
which I have recited, some by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution . . . .”121
Although this recapitulation has been read by a number of scholars122 as
communicating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would absolutely protect unenumerated fundamental rights associated with the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, as well as the personal rights set forth in the first eight
amendments, Lash reads it differently:
If you look closely at the quote, you will see that Howard’s reference to privileges and immunities that “are not and cannot be fully defined in their
entire extent and precise nature” was a reference to rights “secured by the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution,” the Comity
Clause. . . . There is nothing in Howard’s speech . . . that suggests Howard
believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause transformed the equally protected state-secured rights of the Comity Clause into substantive nonenumerated rights of national citizenship. Instead, it appears that Howard simply
included the equally protected “privileges and immunities” of the Comity
Clause as part of the constitutionally secured rights protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, along with the other enumerated rights of the
first eight amendments.123

In short, Lash claims that, by referencing Article IV and Corfield, Howard
simply added to the personal guarantees enumerated in the first eight
amendments, the sojourning citizens’ enumerated right to protection against
parochial discrimination with respect to (unenumerated) fundamental
rights. Lash thus reads Howard as communicating an understanding of the
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” that is consistent
with the ERO theory that Lash attributes to Bingham, Webster, and
Morril.124
Lash then turns to the public debate over the constitutional text that was
sent to the states for ratification on January 13. But for the definition of U.S.
citizenship set forth in the first sentence—the product of a May 30 proposal
119 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See sources cited supra note 19.
123 LASH, supra note 28, at 158.
124 See id. at 158–59.
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by Howard125—the language of Section 1 of the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment is identical to that of Bingham’s third draft:
All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.126

Lash begins his discussion of the public debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment by focusing on newspaper coverage. He points out that both
the New York Times and the New York Herald reported Bingham’s February 26
speech introducing his second draft and lamented that the “immortal Bill of
Rights”127 had been neglected by the states, and that other papers recognized that Congress “was moving toward nationalizing constitutionally enumerated rights.”128
Lash acknowledges that “it is difficult to gauge the degree of public
awareness of the content of the proposal, much less public understanding of
Bingham’s particular theory of the Constitution,” given that (says Lash) Bingham’s congressional colleagues struggled to understand him.129 Still, Lash
maintains that “anyone following the debate . . . would have known that Bingham was attempting to nationalize the Bill of Rights,”130 by which Lash
means the first eight amendments.
Turning to the text that Congress submitted for ratification, Lash finds
that Howard’s introduction to the Senate was widely disseminated and well
received across the political spectrum as a clear, good-faith articulation of the
amendment’s content.131 He also highlights an essay in which Kentucky
jurist Samuel S. Nicholas derided Congress’s “recent attempt . . . to treat [the
Bill of Rights] as guaranties against the State governments” as evidence either
of “stolid ignorance of Constitutional law, or of a shameless effort to impose
upon the ignorant.”132 Lash infers from this reporting and commentary that
“the general idea of the Amendment seemed to be getting through.”133
That idea was further clarified, on Lash’s account, as a consequence of
the Johnson administration’s politically disastrous counteroffensive against
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. In October of 1866, Johnson
arranged to have Secretary of the Interior O.H. Browning pen a letter attack125
126
127
at 1).
128
Id.
129
130
131
132
LEGAL
133

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
Id.
LASH, supra note 28, at 184 (quoting Thirty-Ninth Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1866,
Id. Lash notes that the Herald was the most widely distributed paper in the country.
at 185.
at 185–86.
id. at 187–88.
at 189 (quoting S. S. NICHOLAS, The Civil Rights Act, in 3 CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS,
AND POLITICAL 47, 48–49 (Louisville, Bradley & Gilbert 1867)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
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ing the amendment.134 Browning argued that the amendment was both
unnecessary and destructive of federalism—that state constitutions already
protected citizens’ constitutional rights, such as the right to due process of
law, and that the true “object and purpose” of the amendment was to “totally
annihilate the independence and sovereignty of State judiciaries in the
administration of State laws, and the authority and control of the States over
matters of purely domestic and local concern.”135
But just two months earlier, on July 30, a white mob organized by the
New Orleans mayor massacred mostly black marchers outside of a reconvened Louisiana Constitutional Convention.136 Coming in the wake of this
state-sanctioned slaughter, Browning’s arguments appeared both callous and
wholly unpersuasive. Lash finds that even papers “traditionally disposed to
support the President”137 published editorials describing Browning’s letter as
not only a “huge political blunder”138 but as wrong on the merits—as reflecting a failure to appreciate the need for the federal government to protect
citizens from state-sanctioned mob violence.139
The landslide Republican victory in the November 1866 elections constituted a rejection of the Johnson administration’s Reconstruction policies,
including its opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment.140 Rather than
134 See id. at 211.
135 Letter from O.H. Browning to W.H. Benneson & H.V. Sullivan (Oct. 13, 1866), in
DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Oct. 24, 1866, at 2.
136 See LASH, supra note 28, at 202. At least forty-eight were killed and over two hundred were injured in the massacre. For a recent history, see generally JAMES G. HOLLANDSWORTH, JR., AN ABSOLUTE MASSACRE: THE NEW ORLEANS RACE RIOT OF JULY 30, 1866
(2001). We refer to it as a “massacre” rather than a “riot” not only because the former
term more accurately captures the indiscriminate and brutal slaughter that took place but
also in recognition of the fact that the term “riot” was used within the South during Reconstruction to “[a]scrib[e] a tendency to riot to the freedmen.” See LEEANNA KEITH, THE
COLFAX MASSACRE, at xiii (2008).
137 LASH, supra note 28, at 212.
138 Secretary Browning’s Letter, EVENING POST (N.Y.C.), Oct. 24, 1866, at 2.
139 See Mr. Browning’s Letter, MASS. SPY, Nov. 2, 1866, at 1 (“Th[e] liberty of the mob to
trample upon the weak and helpless, and of the courts to complacently fold their hands
while persons entitled to their protection are lawlessly doomed to death or to a living
despair, is what Mr. Browning classes among the reserved rights of the states . . . .”); Secretary Browning’s Letter, SEMI-WKLY. WIS., Oct. 31, 1866, at 1 (urging that “Mr. Browning must
remember the case of Mr. [Samuel] HOAR, of Massachusetts, who was sent to South Carolina for the purpose of persuading the haughty Legislature of that State to relax some of its
barbarous laws for the imprisonment of colored seamen” and reminding readers that “Mr.
Hoar was absolutely driven out of that State, and not permitted the right of domicil[e] or
the right of free speech, though he was a citizen of the United States”). Hoar, a Massachusetts lawyer, was expelled from South Carolina in 1844. For accounts of his expulsion and
its impact, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 140 (1977); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”:
The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 915 n.32, 938 (1993);
and David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens” on the Eve of
the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1135–36 (2016).
140 See Lash, supra note 28, at 214–15.
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merely exult in their success, Republicans took the opportunity to emphasize
the importance of completing the hard work of ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment. To that end, they continued to expound the amendment’s
meaning, and continued to stress the importance of securing the enumerated rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and due process of
law. Bingham, in the context of discussing a proposed antiwhipping bill,
described the “pending constitutional amendment” as providing for “all the
limitations for personal protection of every article and section of the
Constitution.”141
While Lash concedes that governors and state legislative assemblies “left
little in terms of a historical record,”142 he argues that specific references to
freedom of speech, peaceable assembly and petition, and use of the press as
privileges or immunities143 as well as general references to Section 1’s protection of “all . . . constitutional rights,”144 and “all the rights which the Constitution provides for men,”145 provide “clear evidence that at least some of the
assemblies were well aware of the substantive nature of the rights protected
under Section One, as well as of the textualist nature of the ‘privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.’ ”146
By contrast, he finds that “[n]one of [Section 1’s] supporters described
the Amendment as nationalizing the subject of civil rights in the states.”147
Lash includes among the sources of evidence that support his ERO theory a
series of articles published in the New York Times under the pseudonym
“Madison,”148 speeches made and resolutions adopted by the Southern Loyalists’ Convention,149 and an essay published by Frederick Douglass in an
1867 issue of the Atlantic Monthly.150 We will address these three sources
below in our critique.
Lash also focuses attention on President Johnson’s proposed “counteramendment,” offered after six states had voted for and an equal number had
voted against ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.151 Lash considers
141 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
142 LASH, supra note 28, at 219.
143 Id. at 220.
144 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE RECORD, app. at LVI
(1867)).
145 Id. (quoting PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE RECORD, app. at XCIX (1867)).
146 Id. at 220.
147 Id. at 221.
148 Id. at 217; see Madison, Letter to the Editor, The National Question: The Constitutional
Amendments—National Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1866, at 2 [hereinafter Madison, The
National Question]; Madison, Letter to the Editor, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment—
What It Provides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1866, at 2 [hereinafter Madison, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment].
149 See, e.g., LASH, supra note 28, at 205; see The Southern Loyalists’ Convention, TRIB.
TRACTS NO. 2, Sept. 6, 1866, at 23, 25.
150 See LASH, supra note 28, at 217; Frederick Douglass, An Appeal to Congress for Impartial
Suffrage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1867, at 112, 117.
151 LASH, supra note 28, at 221–22.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL201.txt

524

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

7-JAN-20

14:29

[vol. 95:2

it important that President Johnson felt comfortable replacing the Privileges
or Immunities Clause with what Lash characterizes as “a passive restatement
of Article IV’s Comity Clause.”152 Here is an excerpt of the final version of
Johnson’s counteramendment:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the States in which
they reside, and the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.153

Johnson’s counteramendment did not shift momentum away from ratification. On July 21, 1868, both houses of Congress issued a concurrent resolution declaring that “three fourths and more of the several States of the
Union” had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment—thus satisfying the strictures of Article V—and Johnson acquiesced via his own proclamation of ratification the following week.154
Lash closes out his discussion of the ratification debate by taking note of
a speech delivered, and a letter published, by Judge George W. Paschal.
Judge Paschal was a former member of the Southern Loyalists’ Convention
who helped found Georgetown University’s law department and was among
Georgetown’s first professors of jurisprudence. In a speech before the Texas
House of Representatives, Judge Paschal applauded Congress for “defin[ing]
citizenship according to an universal standard” and for safeguarding citizens
against the abridgment of national privileges or immunities.155
In a letter published in the New York Herald-Tribune, Judge Paschal again
stated that “[t]he lines defining American citizenship will no longer be matter of doubt” and devoted additional attention to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.156 Of the latter’s importance, he wrote that although “[l]aw
readers are so accustomed to see similar provisions in the State Constitutions, . . . they should know that the national bill of rights has, by a common
error, been construed not to apply to or control the States.”157
In Judge Paschal’s words, Lash finds a succinct summary of a “moderate
proposal” that “did not federalize common law civil rights”—any such “radical proposal” to do the latter having “no chance of passage”—but did
“secur[e] those rights already announced in the federal Constitution.”158
The success of that proposal was, Lash argues, made possible through Bingham’s deployment of a term of art with “a history stretching back into stat152 Id. at 222. Lash argues that “it is wholly implausible to think that Johnson would
have introduced [Article IV] language into his counter-amendment” if the 1867 public
understood it to “authoriz[e] federal protection of unenumerated natural rights.” Id.
153 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 240 (1906).
154 15 Stat. 709, 710 (1868).
155 George W. Paschal, Speech in the Hall of the House of Representatives on the 14th
Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (July 27, 1868), in DAILY
AUSTIN REPUBLICAN, July 30, 1868, at 4.
156 George W. Paschal, The Fourteenth Article, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1868, at 2.
157 Id.
158 LASH, supra note 28, at 227.
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utes and treaties of the early nineteenth century,” the “antebellum
understanding” of which that was “brought . . . into the public consciousness
through [Republicans’] explanations of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.”159
D. Postadoption Commentary
Lash is wary of relying upon postratification commentary as evidence of
the original communicative content of the Fourteenth Amendment, owing to
concerns about its reliability.160 Instead, Lash uses original meaning to contextualize postratification commentary. He begins with judicial opinions,
including Judge Luther Day’s opinion for the Ohio Supreme Court in Garnes
v. McCann161 and Justice Joseph Bradley’s circuit court opinion in Live-Stock
Dealers162 holding unlawful a Louisiana slaughterhouse monopoly, the constitutionality of which would later be upheld in the Slaughter-House Cases.
Lash finds that the former is consistent with “the moderate reading of
the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause presented by John Bingham and Jacob
Howard”163 because it held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
“includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United States.”164 Lash acknowledges that
Justice Bradley took “a more expansive approach” in Live-Stock Dealers but
reads Bradley as distinguishing between Article IV “privileges and immunities” and Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or immunities,” just “[a]s would
the majority in Slaughter-House.”165
Lash proceeds to discuss debates over women’s suffrage. Several months
after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, women’s rights
advocate Victoria Woodhull submitted a memorial to both Houses of Congress in which she argued that denying the right to vote to women violated
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.166 When Woodhull presented her
memorial before the House Committee on the Judiciary on January 11, 1871,
Washington lawyer Albert Riddle drew upon Justice Washington’s opinion in
Corfield.167
In a report (“Woodhull Report”) submitted by John Bingham, who
chaired the committee, the House Judiciary Committee responded that the
159 Id.
160 Id. at 230; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552–53 (1994) (describing postratification commentary as “the least reliable source for recovering the original meaning of the law”).
161 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871).
162 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
163 LASH, supra note 28, at 232.
164 Id. (quoting Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 209–10).
165 Id. at 231–34.
166 Id. at 234–35; see S. MISC. DOC. NO. 41-16 (1870).
167 Id.; see A.G. Riddle, Speech in Support of the Woodhull Memorial, Before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 448,
453 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Rochester, N.Y., Charles Mann Printing Co. 1881).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause did not recognize any right to vote. Lash
excerpts a key section of the report:
The clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States,” does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those
privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution,
article 4, section 2. The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, it is believed, did not
add to the privileges or immunities before mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the powers of the
States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of
amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the
States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the provision
of the second section, fourth article.
To remedy this defect of the Constitution, the express limitations upon
the States contained in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
together with the grant of power in Congress to enforce them by legislation,
were incorporated in the Constitution. The words “citizens of the United
States,” and “citizens of the states,” as employed in the Fourteenth Amendment, did not change or modify the relations of citizens of the State and
nation as they existed under the original Constitution.168

The report went on to cite with approval Justice Washington’s opinion in
Corfield.169
It is to Lash’s credit as a scholar that he presents the reader with the
Woodhull Report because it seems flatly inconsistent with his interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The report expressly states that the
set of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” is identical
to—or none “other than”—the set of “privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states” and to the set described by Justice Washington in
Corfield.170 If “article 4, section 2,” was generally understood merely to be a
“Comity Clause” and Corfield to be a comity-only opinion, as Lash would have
it, quite obviously, the enforcement of this Clause by the Fourteenth Amendment would not provide citizens with an absolute security in their enjoyment
of even their enumerated rights, much less the rights included in the Civil
Rights Act.
Lash concedes that he can only speculate as to why Bingham signed off
on this report. In the end, he dubs the highly inconvenient report a “historical oddity that tells us more about sloppy committee work than the original
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”171 This piece of evidence should nevertheless be kept in mind when we turn to our critique of
Lash’s ERO theory of the Clause.
168 LASH, supra note 28, at 236–37 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 41-22, at 1
(1871)).
169 Id. at 237 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 41-22).
170 H.R. REP. NO. 41-22, at 1.
171 LASH, supra note 28, at 240.
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Lash then turns his attention to Bingham’s last, quite different words on
the subject, delivered in defense of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.172 The Ku
Klux Klan Act was introduced by Representative Samuel Shellabarger of
Ohio and was directed not against hostile state action but against private conspiracies to violate the “rights, privileges or immunities of another person”—
including by means of “murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and
battery.”173
Some representatives objected that Congress’s Section 5 powers to
enforce Section 1 did not encompass the prohibition of private violations of
constitutional rights, being that the text of Section 1 forbade only “states”
from abridging the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens, depriving people of due process of law, or denying people the equal protection of the
laws.174 Shellabarger responded to these objections in part by invoking
Corfield and averring that Justice Washington’s opinion listed “fundamental
rights of citizenship” that Congress had power to protect.175
On March 31, in a speech in which he appears to distance himself from
Shellabarger, Bingham stated the reasons why he chose to abandon his original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 Bingham claimed to have been
persuaded by Marshall’s “great decision” in Barron v. Baltimore that the first
eight amendments did not bind the states and to have recognized the need
to supply language that specifically did so:
[I]t was decided, and rightfully, that these [first eight] amendments, defining and protecting the rights of men and citizens, were only limitations on
the power of Congress, not on the power of the States.
In reëxamining that case of Barron . . . after my struggle in the House in
February, 1866, . . . I noted and apprehended as I never did before, certain
words in that opinion of Marshall. Referring to the first eight articles of
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the Chief Justice said:
“Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on
the power of the State governments they would have imitated the framers of
the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention.”
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the original
Constitution. As they had said “no State shall emit bills of credit, pass any
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts[”]; . . . I prepared the provision of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it stands in the Constitution, as follows:
“No State shall . . . .”177
172 Id. at 242; see Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
173 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 69 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger).
174 LASH, supra note 28, at 243.
175 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 69 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger).
176 Id. at 84 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
177 Id. (citation omitted) (first quoting Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250
(1833); and then quoting, with minor variations, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
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Bingham then articulated his own understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. First, Bingham denied that Corfield meant anything more
than that “in civil rights the State could not refuse to extend to citizens of
other States the same general rights secured to its own.”178 In short, Corfield
equals comity. Second, he asked rhetorically: “Is it not clear that other and
different privileges and immunities . . . are secured by the provision of the fourteenth article, that no State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, which are defined in the eight articles of
amendment . . . ?”179 Bingham then counseled the House to “follow the
example of the makers of the Constitution and the builders of the Republic,
by passing laws for enforcing all the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, as guarantied by the amended Constitution and expressly
enumerated in the Constitution.”180
Lash finds “little reason to doubt the sincerity” of Bingham’s interpretation.181 He points out that, during the framing process, Bingham “never
once relied on Corfield, much less natural rights interpretations of
Corfield.”182 According to Lash, Bingham “[o]ver and over again . . .
refer[red] to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in
a manner that reference[d] the express enumerated rights of the Constitution,”183 consistently with his claim that Congress could pass laws to enforce
“privileges and immunities of citizens . . . expressly enumerated in the
Constitution.”184
Lash concludes by discussing the legal reception of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Lash begins with the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in
the Slaughter-House Cases. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel
Miller, the Court denied that a Louisiana slaughtering monopoly that effectively put hundreds of local butchers out of business deprived those butchers
of their “privilege or immunity” to pursue a trade.185
178 Id.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 Id. (emphasis added). Despite this limited reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Bingham nevertheless thought the Ku Klux Klan Act was constitutional because
groups of private actors were presently “trampling under foot the life and liberty, [and]
destroying the property of the citizen.” Id. at 85. Bingham urged that Congress could
“enforce the Constitution” by dispersing those groups by force, without thereby undermining the “dual system of government” he regarded as “essential to our national existence.”
Id. at 84–85.
181 LASH, supra note 28, at 250.
182 Id. at 250–51.
183 Id. at 251.
184 Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
185 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 60 (1873). For a deep-dive into the
opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, see Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
627 (1994). For a summary of competing scholarly narratives concerning the case, see
Randy E. Barnett, The Three Narratives of the Slaughter-House Cases, 41 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 295
(2016).
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Lash applauds Justice Miller for distinguishing between the privileges
and immunities protected by Article IV and those protected by Section 1.
Although Justice Miller embraced Justice Washington’s definition in Corfield
of “fundamental” rights for Article IV purposes, Justice Miller denied that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause did more than protect the right to
comity.186
Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Miller contended that
interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause to transform the rights listed
in Corfield into absolutely protected national rights would “radically chang[e]
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to
each other and of both these governments to the people.”187 Justice Miller
reasoned that such an interpretation ought to be avoided “in the absence of
language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt”—
and he found no such language in Section 1.188 Lash states that the results
of his own inquiry “strongly suggest[ ] that . . . Miller was absolutely right.”189
Lash denies that Justice Miller “clos[ed] the door on viewing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting enumerated constitutional
rights.”190 He points out that Justice Miller identified the enumerated right
to peaceably assemble to petition the government, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the right to become a citizen of a state through bona fide
residence in that state, as protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.191 He laments, however, that Justice Miller’s opinion “is not clear
about which textual rights are protected or how they are protected.”192
In Lash’s narrative, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was rendered a
virtual nullity, not by the Slaughter-House Cases, but, rather, by the Court’s
1876 decision in Cruikshank.193 The latter case involved the prosecution of
the perpetrators194 of the Colfax Massacre—what historian Eric Foner has
described as “[t]he bloodiest single instance of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era”195—under the Enforcement Act of 1870. In Cruikshank, the
186 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75–76.
187 Id. at 78.
188 Id.
189 LASH, supra note 28 at 258.
190 Id. at 253.
191 See id. at 253 n.93; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
192 LASH, supra note 28, at 264.
193 Id.; see United States. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
194 As Justice Samuel Alito would recount in his opinion for the Court in McDonald,
William Cruikshank “allegedly marched unarmed African-American prisoners through the
streets and then had them summarily executed.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 757 (2010); see also CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 106 (2008) (detailing how
Cruikshank “ma[de] a sport out of lining” up two black men “so close to each other that he
could kill them with a single bullet”).
195 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 437 (1988). For
two compelling recent histories, published nearly simultaneously, see generally KEITH,
supra note 136; and LANE, supra note 194. After noting disputes about the precise number,
Lane estimates that between sixty-two and eighty-one black Republican candidates who
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Court held that the right to assemble and petition was limited to the protection of assemblies, the purpose of which was to petition the federal government for redress of grievances.196
Accordingly, the Court concluded that members of a mob that slaughtered dozens of black Republicans could not be indicted for “prevent[ing] a
meeting for any lawful purpose whatever.”197 The Court also held that members of the mob could not be indicted for conspiring to prevent people from
“bearing arms for a lawful purpose,” reasoning that the Second Amendment
“has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government,
leaving the people to look [to states and municipalities] for their protection
against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes.”198 In
sum, writes Lash, the Court “removed from the scope of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause the very violation of life and liberty that fueled the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”199
Lash concludes his discussion of the legal reception of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause by examining several treatises—the second edition of
Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, published in 1871; John Norton
Pomeroy’s 1868 An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States; the
second edition of Timothy Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of the United
States, published in 1869; and George Paschal’s 1868 Annotated Constitution of
the United States.200 He reports that all but Cooley—who doubted whether
Section 1 “surround[ed] the citizen with any protections additional to those
before possessed under the State constitutions”201—agreed “that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would overturn the doctrine of Barron v.
Baltimore.”202
II. CRITIQUE
Lash’s research on the Privileges or Immunities Clause is almost overwhelming. One cannot but admire Lash’s energy, his attention to detail, his
willingness to pursue the evidence, though it may take him into areas of law
not previously considered relevant to his core interpretive goal, and the precision and clarity of his prose.
peacefully occupied the Grant Parish courthouse after a county election were slaughtered
by a white mob, many after surrendering. LANE, supra note 194, at 265–66. Keith points
out that the state of Louisiana placed on historical marker on the site of the massacre in
1951 which celebrated the death of “150 negroes” and “the end of carpetbag misrule in the
South.” KEITH, supra note 136, at xii. The number of whites killed—three—is not in dispute. LANE, supra note 194, at 265.
196 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
197 Id. at 553.
198 Id.
199 LASH, supra note 28, at 267.
200 Id. at 273–74.
201 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 313 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1871).
202 LASH, supra note 28, at 274.
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Lash is presently under contract with the University of Chicago Press to
produce a three-volume set of historical materials relating to the adoption of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—a much-needed
follow-up to Phillip Kurland’s four-volume The Founders’ Constitution, which
includes historical materials relating to the 1788 Constitution and 1789
amendments. Given his prodigious learning, we cannot think of anyone better for the job.
Before we proceed to commentary that will be primarily critical, it is
worth singling out certain features of Lash’s analysis that we find persuasive.
First, we are persuaded that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was generally understood in antebellum caselaw to guarantee sojourning citizens equality in the enjoyment of fundamental civil rights, not to
“absolutely” guarantee to all citizens the enjoyment of such rights. Lash’s
exegesis of leading antebellum cases is generally convincing.203
Second, we continue to share with Lash the view that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not merely provide for the enforcement of the right
to comity. Lash’s case against the comity-only view advanced by Philip
Hamburger204 is devastating. As Lash puts it, “[t]here is just too much historical evidence to the contrary.”205 Further, Hamburger’s claim that freedmen “had little need for assurances of any particular substantive federal
203 We are not, however, convinced by his analysis of Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH.
535 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1797). As others have pointed out, the opinion’s author—likely Judge
Jeremiah Chase rather than Justice Samuel Chase—used comity-only language and fundamental-rights language. Thus, Judge Chase stated that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause
means that the citizens of all the states shall have the peculiar advantage of
acquiring and holding real as well as personal property, and that such property
shall be protected and secured by the laws of the state, in the same manner as the
property of the citizens of the state is protected.
Id. at 554 (emphasis added). David Upham has observed that “[t]hese two privileges corresponded perfectly to two of the main privileges of subjectship . . . : the right to acquire and
hold real property and the freedom from aliens’ duties and restrictions.” David R. Upham,
Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1483, 1501 (2005). Chase’s language does not suggest that the first of these privileges
has any relation to comity. See also Richard L. Aynes, Article IV and Campbell v. Morris:
Wrong Judge, Wrong Court, Wrong Holding, and Wrong Conclusion? (Univ. of Akron Sch. Law,
Akron Research Paper No. 09-13, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510809 (arguing that
scholars have generally misunderstood Campbell, misidentified its author, and overstated its
significance).
204 See generally Hamburger, supra note 69.
205 See LASH, supra note 28, at 283. Lash deals what appears to us to be a decisive blow
to Hamburger’s specific claim that the language of a comity-protective privileges-andimmunities bill introduced by Shellabarger inspired Bingham. Lash points out, not only
that Shellabarger’s bill was never debated or discussed, but that Representative James Wilson added an amendment to the bill which clarified that “the enumeration of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in this act contained shall not be deemed a denial or
abridgment of any other rights, privileges, or immunities which appertain to citizenship
under the Constitution.” Id. (quoting H.R. 437, 39th Cong. § 12 (1866)). Wilson’s amendment strongly suggests that “members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not believe the
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rights” appears unsustainable on the basis of the evidence presented by
Lash.206 What good would the right to comity have done blacks who were
massacred by local mobs in their own states?
Finally, we accept Lash’s claim that Republicans generally, and Bingham
in particular, were concerned with securing certain fundamental rights associated with national citizenship without empowering Congress or the federal
courts to act—as Justice Miller put it—as “perpetual censor[s] upon all legislation of the States.”207 (Indeed, the dissenters in Slaughter-House denied the
existence of any such implication of their more expansive reading of the
Clause.)
We reach different conclusions concerning how the ultimate balance
between individual-rights protection and state autonomy was struck. But we
are persuaded by Lash’s arguments that “the more radical members of Congress” were unable to secure the ratification of an amendment that embodied their first-order preferences about the distribution of federal and state
power.208 The federalism of the founding survived to a greater extent than it
otherwise might have.
In the end, however, we are unpersuaded that Lash’s core thesis is correct. In what follows, we will argue that “competent speakers of the English
language who [we]re aware of the context in which the text was communicated for ratification”209 likely did not understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause as Lash does.
A. Lash’s ERO Theory Lacks Support in Antebellum Jurisprudence
Lash’s case for the privileges or immunities “of citizens of the United
States” as an antebellum term of art that was used in connection with enumerated constitutional rights (and only enumerated constitutional rights) is
based primarily on evidence drawn from debates over the admission of Missouri.210 There are two problems with Lash’s term-of-art case.
First, Lash does not demonstrate that any consensus developed during
the Missouri debates concerning the distinction between Article IV rights of
state citizenship and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, or
that anyone who participated in the Missouri debates held the ERO theory
that is key to his thesis. Second, Lash neglects other evidence that renders
improbable the general acceptance of his ERO theory during the antebellum
period.
Careful scrutiny of the evidence Lash adduces from the Missouri debates
reveals that slavery and free-state advocates held very different understandrights of the Comity Clause were the only privileges or immunities of national citizenship.”
Id. at 283.
206 Hamburger, supra note 69, at 71.
207 LASH, supra note 28, at 257 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (15 Wall.) 36,
78 (1873)).
208 Id. at 69.
209 Id. at 277.
210 Id. at 47–66.
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ings of the same treaty language; that they advanced a variety of arguments in
support of their respective understandings; and that it is unlikely that any
consensus understanding of the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship
developed.
Slavery advocates, for their part, generally denied that Congress had the
power to require Missouri to ban slavery because the “rights, advantages and
immunities of citizens of the U[nited] States” included “the right to republican self-government or the right of an entering state to equal status with the
original states of the Union.”211 True, as Lash emphasizes, sometimes slavery
advocates invoked constitutional text, such as the Guarantee Clause and the
Tenth Amendment.212 But Lash does not acknowledge that slavery advocates at other times relied instead upon general political-philosophical principles and invoked unenumerated rights.213
Nor does Lash recognize that some slavery advocates denied any distinction between the rights of state citizenship protected by Article IV and rights
of national citizenship protected by the Cession Act. Indeed, as the debate
raged, the General Assembly of Virginia issued resolutions expressly denying
211 Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Louis McLane, Speech of Mr.
McLane, of Delaware, on the Missouri Question (Feb. 7, 1820), in AM. WATCHMAN (Wilmington, Del.), Mar. 29, 1820, at 2)).
212 See, e.g., 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1196–97 (1819) (statement of Rep. Scott) (arguing
that “the most valuable and prominent” of the “rights, privileges, and immunities” guaranteed by the Cession Act to the people of Missouri was that of “forming and modifying their
own State constitution” and that the choice to decide whether to recognize property in
people was guaranteed by the Guarantee Clause, the Ninth Amendment, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
213 See, e.g., 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 563 (1820) (statement of Rep. Smyth) (describing
“right of self-government” as “a natural inherent right of mankind” and claiming that Missouri became entitled to exercise it by recognizing slavery as soon as it “ceased to be governed as a Territory”); 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1341 (1820) (statement of Rep. Rankin)
(invoking “right [of inhabitants of Missouri] to form their own constitution, and shape
their own municipal regulations,” drawing no connection to constitutional text); 35
ANNALS OF CONG. 1233 (1820) (statement of Sen. Barbour) (arguing that “[a] State, to be
sovereign and independent, must govern itself by its own authority and laws” and questioning whether Missouri can “govern herself by her own authority and laws, in relation to the
subject of slavery” if it is required to ban slavery as a condition of its admission); id. at 197
(statement of Sen. Leake) (rights guaranteed by Article III of the Cession Act include right
of people of territories to “form a Constitution for themselves, upon republican principles”); 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1231–32 (1819) (statement of Rep. McLane) (appealing to the
“undoubted right of every people, when admitted to be a State, to become free, sovereign,
and independent—free to make their own constitution and laws” and claiming that this
right encompasses the right to hold slaves “if they please to do so”); id. at 1227 (1819)
(statement of Rep. Walker) (arguing that the slavery ban would “tak[e] away from the
people of [the Missouri] territory the natural and Constitutional right of legislating for
themselves” and counting the latter right among “their privileges as freemen”). But see 35
ANNALS OF CONG. 245 (1820) (statement of Sen. Otis) (denying that “the right of selfgovernment in the people, or the faculty of making a State constitution” belonged to any
but the “people of the several old United States, vested in them by the laws of nature and
nations”).
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that distinction and rejecting the proposition that the “rights secured by the
treaty are such only as are conferred by the federal constitution.”214
We emphasize that we are not endorsing the proslavery position. It is
Lash who appeals to what he views as a consensus between antislavery and
proslavery advocates concerning the distinction between Article IV rights and
the “rights, advantages, and immunities of US citizens.”215 Our point is that
Lash overstates the consensus, and that this lack of consensus undermines
Lash’s term-of-art case.
Of course, because slavery advocates were slavery advocates, there is no
reason to think that Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress would have
cared what they thought. But free-state advocates do not seem to have shared
the kind of ERO theory that Lash’s thesis depends upon. Yes, some free-state
advocates argued that the “right” to hold slaves was unprotected by Article IV
because it was not recognized in the Constitution’s text.216 But those same
advocates, as well as others, also argued that only rights that were uniformly
held across the nation by similarly situated citizens were “rights, advantages,
and immunities” of citizens of the United States;217 that slaveholding was not
“essential to constitute [United States] citizenship”;218 that Article III of the
Cessation Act’s promise was limited to those rights in Louisiana in 1803, or to
areas inhabited in 1803;219 that the Cession Act served as a general guarantee
of equal footing to newly admitted states but that the proposed restrictions
were consistent with that guarantee;220 that congressional power over the
214 H.R. 5, 1820 Gen. Assemb., (Va.), in ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 113, 122 (Richmond, Thomas Ritchie 1820) (“Is there a class
of people in this country, who are citizens of the United States, and not citizens of any
state, or territory, or district in the union? If so, how have they become such, and what
rights do they possess? There are no such people.”).
215 LASH, supra note 28, at 59.
216 Id. at 58–59.
217 Id. at 59; see 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1379 (1820) (statement of Rep. Darlington)
(inferring that the right to hold slaves is not a federal right from the facts that “the people
of Missouri may, themselves, exclude slavery” and that “Congress may prohibit slavery in a
territory”); RUFUS KING, SUBSTANCE OF TWO SPEECHES, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MISSOURI BILL 15 (New York, Kirk & Mercein 1819)
(“[F]ederal rights[ ] are uniform throughout the Union, and are common to all its
citizens . . . .”).
218 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 146 (1820) (statement of Sen. Morril); see also id. at 206 (statement of Sen. Lowrie) (denying that “the toleration of slavery is necessary for the self-preservation of the people of Missouri”).
219 See id. at 215 (statement of Sen. Burrill) (Article III “cannot refer to persons already
citizens of the United States who buy land and remove thither; such require no aid from
the treaty.”); John Sergeant, Speech of Mr. Sergeant on the Missouri Question in the
House of Representatives (July 22, 1820), in 18 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 367, 380 (1820) (Only
“those who were inhabitants of the ceded territory, and subjects of the ceding power, at the
time of the cession” can “call the treaty to their aid.”).
220 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 214–15 (1820) (statement of Sen. Burrill) (“Will [Missouri]
not have her Senators, her Representative, her Electors, by the same rules as other States?
Must not all the regulations of her commerce, all her relations to the Union, and to other
States, be the same as those of Ohio or Vermont? Will she not, according to her popula-
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admission of territories was absolute and trumped contrary treaty language;221 and that slavery could not be a privilege of citizenship because
“what is gained by the masters must be lost by the slaves.”222
Further, what arguments-from-enumeration free-state advocates did
make do not reflect the influence of Lash’s distinctive ERO theory. Recall
that Lash’s theory holds that all enumerated personal rights and only enumerated personal rights are among the privileges and immunities of U.S.
citizenship. Although both Webster and Morril listed federal rights that
appear in the constitutional text, neither listed any of the personal rights set
forth in the first eight amendments.223
Morril, observes Lash, listed rights relating to federal representation and
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.224 Webster listed rights to federal
representation and the right to a republican form of government.225 It is
thus possible that both men understood the “rights, advantages and immunities” guaranteed by the Cession Act to encompass only what Lash describes as
“constitutionally express structural guarantees”226 related to participation in
and access to institutions of the national government on equal footing with
citizens of other states upon admission to the Union.227 Lash does not contion, have the same power and weight as other States?”); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1209 (1819)
(statement of Rep. Tallmadge) (“If the proposed amendment prevails, the inhabitants of
Louisiana or the citizens of the United States can neither of them take slaves into the State
of Missouri. All, therefore, may enjoy equal privileges.”).
221 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 216 (1820) (statement of Sen. Burrill) (“If, by the Constitution,
‘Congress have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting,
the territory and other property belonging to the United States,’ and might . . . prevent
migration and importation into the territories and new States . . . , and if the treaty diminishes this power, then the treaty is contrary to the Constitution, and in that article void.”);
id. at 149 (statement of Sen. Morril) (“The power of Congress over this territory is sovereign and complete.”); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1209 (1819) (statement of Rep. Tallmadge)
(“The Senate, or the treaty-making power of our Government, have neither the right nor
the power to stipulate, by a treaty, the terms upon which a people shall be admitted into
the Union. This House have a right to be heard on the subject.”); .
222 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1182 (1819) (statement of Rep. Fuller).
223 We are not the first to make this observation. See Bret Boyce, The Magic Mirror of
“Original Meaning”: Recent Approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. REV. 29, 47
(2013) (“[A]s Lash himself points out, Webster’s and Morril’s discussions of federal constitutional rights involved ‘structural guarantees of federalism and access to federal courts,’
not the guarantees of the first eight amendments.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Lash, The
Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I, supra note 27, at 1293)).
224 LASH, supra note 28, at 57; David Morril, Remarks of Mr. Morril in the Senate of the
United States on the Missouri Question (Jan. 17, 1820), in HILLSBORO’ TELEGRAPH
(Amherst, N.H.), Mar. 4, 1820, at 1.
225 WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 102, at 16.
226 LASH, supra note 28, at 58.
227 Other lists put forward by free-state advocates are similar in this regard. See, e.g., 35
ANNALS OF CONG. 245 (1820) (statement of Sen. Otis) (Inhabitants of Louisiana “shall be
eligible to be Presidents, Vice Presidents, members of Congress, and capable of sustaining
all offices under the Constitution, civil and military, and entitled to their fair and proportionate share of all the great contracts and little contracts, and to all sorts of privileges and
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sider this possibility, even though it would be consistent with an equal-footing
function of the Act that was identified by Secretary of State James Madison
shortly before the Louisiana treaty’s adoption;228 by participants in the Missouri debate229; and by antebellum courts.230 That is not the ERO theory to
which Lash is attached.
We can, however, identify instances when the language of privileges or
immunities “of citizens of the United States” was used in connection with
certain enumerated personal rights as well, both during the Missouri debate
and during the antebellum era more generally. During the Missouri debate,
Representative Louis McLane of Delaware claimed that the right of states to
choose whether to admit or exclude slavery was as much a right under Article
III as “the right to be represented in Congress, or the right to a freedom of
religious opinion, or the right to have the slaves accounted a part of their
population.”231
Lash also cites an 1835 letter from Attorney General Benjamin Butler,
who wrote that citizens of the United States residing in Arkansas territory
who sought to frame a constitution without a prior enabling act by Congress
“possess[ed] the ordinary privileges and immunities of the United States,”
including the right “peaceably to assemble and to petition the government
for the redress of grievances.”232
advantages enjoyed by any other citizen of the Union in that capacity.”); id. at 183 (statement of Sen. Mellen) (“The new State shall be entitled to two Senators in Congress; to
Representatives in Congress according to the established ratio; to Electors of President and
Vice President; to the benefit of Federal Courts; the Constitutional guaranty of protection
against invasion; and all other advantages and immunities which are of a federal nature.”).
For an earlier articulation of an equal-footing understanding, see 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 54
(1803) (statement of Sen. Tracy) (“The obvious meaning of [Article III] is, that the inhabitants of Louisiana are incorporated, by it, into the Union, upon the same footing that the
Territorial Governments are, and, like them, the Territory, when the population is sufficiently numerous, must be admitted as a State, with every right of any other State.”).
228 Madison’s outline of the Louisiana treaty announced the purpose of
“incorporat[ing] the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the
United States on an equal footing” and thereby “constituting them a regular and integral
portion of the union.” EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803–1812, at 66 (1920) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Robert
Livingston & James Monroe (Mar. 2, 1803), in 12 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 1096, 1101,
1106 (1803)).
229 See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 215 (1820) (statement of Sen. Burrill) (“The true meaning
of the clause must be, that the inhabitants shall be put on the same footing as other citizens of the United States, as to their political rights, and to the same extent as if nativeborn . . . .”).
230 See City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 235 (1835) (concluding
that the treaty provision was designed to ensure “that Louisiana shall be admitted into the
union as soon as possible, upon an equal footing with the other states”).
231 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1233 (1819) (statement of Rep. McLane).
232 Letter from Benjamin Butler, U.S. Attorney Gen., to John Forsyth, U.S. Sec’y of
State (Sept. 21, 1835), in 21 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERRITORY OF
ARKANSAS, 1829–1836, at 1082, 1087 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1954).
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This evidence does not help Lash very much. Lash does not merely
claim that the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens included some enumerated rights. We agree it does. Rather, Lash advances the much more difficult-to-prove claim that the language of privileges and immunities of U.S.
citizenship was understood during the antebellum period to include all enumerated rights and only enumerated rights. We cannot infer that an all-andonly-enumerated-rights understanding was widely held from isolated references to particular enumerated rights.
McLane cited no constitutional text for the proposition that states enjoy
the right to choose whether to admit or exclude slavery, resting instead on
general principles of popular sovereignty.233 To say, as Butler did, that the
right to peaceable assembly and petition is “among” the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens is not to imply that the federal enumeration of a right is
either necessary or sufficient to make it such a privilege or immunity of U.S.
citizenship.
The right to peaceable assembly and petition might well be “among”
those rights that belong in the family of “rights, privileges, and immunities”
because they were uniformly deemed fundamental to citizenship by states,
federally enumerated or not; it might be among them because it is in fact
fundamental to citizenship, even if it was not uniformly deemed fundamental
by states. Lash neglects these possibilities.
The caselaw concerning the Cession Act, both prior and subsequent to
the debate over the Missouri question, does not suggest that an ERO theory
was widely held.234 To discuss all of the cases in which antebellum judges
interpreting such treaty language made no reference to any ERO theory
would add considerable length to an already lengthy critique.235 We will
focus on four cases.
233 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149–50 (1820) (statement of Rep. McLane).
234 For criticism along the similar lines, see Green, supra note 19, at 111 (adducing
“evidence . . . which Lash does not confront, that the 1803 promise of the rights of citizens
of the United States was understood as a promise of the rights of other similarly situated
citizens of the United States”).
235 See, e.g., Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 117, 133 (1835) (identifying “the
perfect inviolability and security of property” as a right of citizenship); Lessee of Pollard’s
Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 376 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (stating that
former noncitizens have “the same constitutional right [as citizens] to invoke the protection of the judicial power of the state or Union, against the invasion of [their] rights of
person or property, wherever [they] might be located”); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
Naglee, 1 Cal. 232, 242, 250–51 (1850) (upholding a mining tax that was imposed on
noncitizens and indicating that both the Treaty of Queretaro between the U.S. and Mexico
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause might prohibit such a tax on naturalized citizens); Ward v. Broadwell, 1 N.M. 75, 85 (1854) (referring to the right of “exercising the
paternal and marital powers and the like”). For an extended discussion of these and other
cases, see Upham, supra note 139, at 1124–27. Upham concludes that “in the decades
before the Civil War, there was largely a convergence in the interpretations of the respective ‘privileges and immunities’ secured by the treaties and Article IV (according to
Corfield).” Id. at 1127.
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Less than a decade after the acquisition of Louisiana, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in 1812 held that a Saint Domingue refugee named Jean
Baptiste Desbois who failed to report his arrival to federal officials in 1806,
and thus never began the naturalization process, had nevertheless acquired
citizenship through the admission of Louisiana into the Union.236 As a consequence, Desbois was held to be entitled to “all the rights and priviledges of
a citizen of the United States”—including the federally unenumerated privilege of practicing law in Louisiana.237
The same year, a Louisiana district court decided a case involving an
Irishman known only as Laverty who was ordered by a federal marshal to
move forty miles from the Mississippi River, pursuant to an ordinance applicable to enemy aliens.238 Laverty argued that he, like Desbois, had acquired
American citizenship through the Cession Act, and thus could not be subjected to such alienage-based disabilities.239 A state court ruled in Laverty’s
favor, and the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to review the decision.240
The courts made no effort to ground the right to be free from alienage-based
disabilities in constitutional text. Lash does not examine these cases.
In the very year that Butler penned his letter identifying an enumerated
personal right as one of the privileges of national citizenship, the Supreme
Court of the United States strongly implied that certain unenumerated rights
were also among those privileges. New Orleans v. De Armas241 concerned a
dispute over a lot in New Orleans that the city claimed was part of a quay and
was dedicated to the city’s use in the original plan of the town. Those who
currently possessed the lot sought to confirm their rights and enjoin the city
from disturbing them.242 After a district court ruled in the possessors’ favor
and the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the decision, the Supreme Court
heard the city’s appeal under section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.243
In determining that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy,
Chief Justice John Marshall discussed the “objects” of Article III of the Cession Act:
One, that Louisiana shall be admitted into the union as soon as possible,
upon an equal footing with the other states, and the other, that, till such
admission, the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be protected in the
free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion.244
236 Desbois’ Case, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 185, 185, 201–02 (La. 1812).
237 Id. This is the very right that the Supreme Court would later deny was a privilege or
immunity of U.S. citizens on the day after its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases was
announced. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138–39 (1873).
238 United States v. Laverty, 26 F. Cas. 875 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569a).
239 Id. at 876.
240 Id. at 876–77.
241 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224 (1835).
242 Id. at 234.
243 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; New Orleans, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 234;
De Armas v. Mayor, 5 La. 132 (E.D. La. 1833).
244 New Orleans, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 235.
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Marshall then considered whether “[t]he right to bring questions of title
decided in a state court, before this tribunal,” was among the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States” and concluded that the
answer was no.245
Importantly, Marshall did not rest his conclusion on the ground that the
right to bring questions of title decided in state court before the federal
Supreme Court was not constitutionally enumerated. In fact, he argued that
“[t]he inhabitants of Louisiana enjoy all the advantages of American citizens,
in common with their brethren in their sister states, when their titles are
decided by the tribunals of the state.”246
The clear implication is that the constitutionally unenumerated right to
have titles decided by the tribunals of one’s own state was among the “rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.” It just was not a
right that could be protected by a federal court (as the Republicans would
later rue). Marshall’s language does not suggest any awareness of, let alone
reliance upon, an ERO theory. Rather, it seems as if the “advantages of
American citizens” are those that American citizens generally “enjoy . . . in
common with their brethren in their sister states.”
Lash also does not explain why, if the language of privileges and immunities “of citizens of the United States” was widely used to denote enumerated
rights, and only enumerated rights, Justices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis declined to use it for that purpose in their dissents in Dred Scott when
responding to Justice John Catron’s concurrence. Justice Catron, drawing
upon the Cession Act, maintained that “Louisiana was a province where slavery was not only lawful, but where property in slaves was the most valuable of
all personal property.”247 It therefore followed that the Congress could not
“repeal the third article of the treaty of 1803, in so far as it secured the right
to hold slave property” through the Missouri Compromise.248
Justice McLean responded by denying that any slavery-related guarantee
extended “further than the protection of property in slaves at that time in the
ceded territory,”249 and by pointing out that that guarantee had been complied with.250 Justice Curtis responded by arguing that Article III was “not
intended to restrain the Congress from excluding slavery from that part of
the ceded territory then uninhabited,”251 and that it did not “secure to
[inhabitants] the right to go upon the public domain ceded by the treaty,
either with or without their slaves.”252 Relying upon Marshall’s analysis in
Armas, Justice Curtis described Article III as a “temporary stipulation . . . in
behalf of French subjects who then inhabited a small portion of Louisiana”
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 524 (1856) (Catron, J., concurring).
248 See id. at 525–26 (emphasis omitted).
249 Id. at 557 (McLean, J., dissenting).
250 Id.
251 Id. at 631 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
252 Id.
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rather than “a permanent restriction upon the power of Congress to regulate
territory then uninhabited.”253
Of particular relevance here, however, is the fact that neither dissenting
Justice claimed that the right to hold slaves was unprotected by Article III
because that right was not enumerated in the federal Constitution and so could
not be among the “rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the
United States.” Such an argument would have been expected, had the antebellum legal meaning of “privileges or immunities” been limited to enumerated guarantees.
The silence is deafening. Lash does not identify a single case in which an
antebellum judge relied upon an ERO theory when interpreting treaty references to the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship. Indeed, Lash does
not show that any judge was even aware of the existence of such a theory.
Recall that Lash’s term-of-art thesis depends, first, upon the alleged existence of a widespread acceptance of his ERO theory of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship within the legal community. Then either (a) this
legal understanding must have been effectively communicated to the ratifying public by the Fourteenth Amendment’s supporters or (b) the public consciously deferred to legal understanding. The absence of any support in
pre–Civil War jurisprudence for Lash’s ERO theory makes the first step
needed to get this theory off the ground highly improbable.
Thus, we cannot put much credence in the existence of an antebellum
consensus that the language of privileges or immunities of “citizens of the
United States” was widely used to denote a different set of rights than the
“privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states,” and we give even
less credence to a claim of a widely held ERO theory of that language. The
failure of Lash’s term-of-art argument is not, however, necessarily fatal to the
ERO theory.
Bingham may have deployed a distinction between the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens and those of citizens in the several states in 1866
that was sometimes used during the antebellum period to distinguish enumerated rights that were protected absolutely from unenumerated rights that
were protected only against parochial discrimination. At which point, debate
in the Thirty-Ninth Congress might have led to the development of a consensus within Congress that the set of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens
that would be protected by Section 1 consisted only in enumerated rights,
and that those rights would be protected absolutely. After which, that consensus understanding might have been communicated to the public.
To be clear, this is not the argument that Lash makes on behalf of his
ERO theory. Nonetheless, it is plausible enough to be worth considering in
the next Section.

253

Id. at 632.
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B. Lash’s ERO Theory Was Not Widely Held by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers
As we have explained, Lash presents Bingham’s use of the language of
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” as a solution to a
twofold political problem. According to Lash, Bingham always wanted to
empower Congress and the federal courts to absolutely secure enumerated
rights.254 Over time, however, he perceived a concern on the part of fellow
Republicans that the language of “privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states” was too broad and would destroy federalism.255 According to
Lash, Bingham also became worried that, because his reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not widely shared, the language of his first
proposed amendment would be understood to protect only the right to
comity.256
Due to these two concerns, Bingham searched for a Goldilocks solution,
which he found in the term-of-art meaning of “privileges or immunities” that
we critiqued in the previous Section. But Lash produces not one scintilla of
direct evidence that, when Bingham opted for “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” rather than “privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states” when advancing his second proposal, he took inspiration from antebellum treaty jurisprudence or sought to address the
concerns about unduly broad and unduly narrow readings. Bingham never
mentioned any treaty cases or commentaries or drew upon any treaty language in connection with privileges and/or immunities.
As we saw, Lash contends that Bingham’s goals can be inferred from (a)
Republicans’ defenses of his second draft as merely protecting comity rights;
(b) Hale’s critique of his second draft as unduly broad; (c) Hotchkiss’s critique of his second draft as both unduly broad and unduly narrow; (d) Bingham’s express references to the “bill of rights” and to textually enumerated
rights in his explanation of his third draft;257 (e) his claim that it “hath that
extent—no more”;258 and (f) the fact that Bingham’s explanation of his
third draft “satisfied the conservative side of the House.”259
Lash singles out commentary from Representatives William Higby and
Frederick Woodbridge, both of whom claimed that Bingham’s second draft
would provide for the enforcement of comity rights. Lash claims that they
understood his Article IV–based language to do “nothing more” than protect
comity rights.260 This claim, however, is unsubstantiated.
That Woodbridge in particular did not understand Bingham’s second
draft to protect only comity rights is clear from a portion of the commentary
254 LASH, supra note 28, at 247.
255 Id. at 106.
256 Id. at 109.
257 Id. at 153–54.
258 Id. at 154 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Bingham)).
259 Id. at 153.
260 Id. at 98.
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that is presented and discussed by Lash. In this passage, Woodbridge avers
that the proposed draft is “intended to enable Congress to give all citizens
the inalienable rights of life and liberty, and to every citizen in whatever State
he may be that protection to his property which is extended to the other
citizens of the State.”261 Thus, Woodbridge is adding comity rights to the
absolute protection of other inalienable (natural) rights.
Nor do we perceive in either Hale or Hotchkiss’s critiques of Bingham’s
second draft concerns related to Bingham’s use of the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Recall that this draft read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.262

Hale appears to have been concerned that the language would grant to
Congress a primary power to “legislate upon all matters pertaining to the life,
liberty, and property” as Congress deemed “necessary and proper,” not merely
to take action in response to state violations of the “bill of rights.”263 Hotchkiss seems to have shared this concern.
Indeed, Hotchkiss made plain that he understood Bingham’s second
draft “authoriz[ing] Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the
United States” rather than as a means of “provid[ing] by laws of Congress for
the enforcement of . . . rights.”264 He then indicated that, while he was
“unwilling that Congress shall have [the former] power” he would “go with
[Bingham]” if he were to provide for the latter.265 In short, Hale and Hotchkiss’s problem with this language might have more to do with McCulloch v.
Maryland, than with Corfield v. Coryell.
Lash reads Hotchkiss to have “s[een] nothing in the Amendment that
implicated the federal Bill of Rights” and to have “presumed the proposal was
nothing more than an effort to authorize federal enforcement of the equalaccess principle of the Comity Clause.”266 This seems wrong. Here is Hotchkiss, just before the vote on the motion to postpone debate on Bingham’s
first proposed amendment:
As I understand it, [Bingham’s] object in offering this resolution and proposing this amendment is to provide that no State shall discriminate
between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another. If this amendment secured that, I should vote very cheerfully for it to-day; but as I do not regard it as permanently securing those
rights, I shall vote to postpone its consideration until there can be a further
261 Id. at 98–99 (emphasis added) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088
(1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge)).
262 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866).
263 Id. at 1065 (statement of Rep. Hale).
264 Id. at 1087, 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
265 Id. at 1095.
266 LASH, supra note 28, at 109–10.
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conference between the friends of the measure, and we can devise some
means whereby we shall secure those rights beyond a question.267

Lash presents this language as evidence that Hotchkiss understood Bingham’s first draft to protect only the right to comity—that is, the equal protection of the rights of out-of-state sojourners within a state.268 But a comity-only
amendment would not prevent any state from discriminating between different classes of “its citizens”; it would only bar discrimination against sojourning citizens from other states. Thus, Hotchkiss seems to have regarded
Bingham’s amendment, not as failing to reach the necessary rights, but as
failing to “permanently secur[e]” those rights because the decision of whether to
protect them or not lay solely within the discretion of Congress.
We agree with Michael Zuckert269 that Hotchkiss was troubled by the
proposed amendment’s omission of an express prohibition on states violating privileges and immunities—to, as Hotchkiss put it, “provide . . . that no
State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens.”270 Hotchkiss appears
to have believed that Bingham’s second draft “le[ft] it to the caprice of Congress” to prevent states from discriminating as a consequence of this omission.271 Although Bingham maintained that the language of Article IV was
sufficient to prohibit state discrimination, in Hotchkiss’s view, the amendment ought to have made “plain” that citizens enjoyed a “constitutional right
that cannot be wrested from [them]” and it did not do so.272
So, the real Goldilocks problem confronting Bingham appears to have
been this: On the one hand, a “necessary and proper”–type amendment
seemed to hand Congress a plenary power to legislate on all matters concerning civil rights. On the other hand, the amendment did not bar states from
violating civil rights. It was a lose-lose proposition in both directions. We are
thus unsurprised that Bingham’s next draft included language that expressly
prohibited states from abridging privileges or immunities. Ultimately this
state prohibition in Section 1 would be conjoined with a congressional
enforcement power in Section 5.
What of Bingham’s May 10 explanation of his third version of the
amendment, which Lash claims represented a substantive departure from the
267 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss)
(emphasis added).
268 Compare id., with LASH, supra note 28, at 99 (arguing that “Woodbridge . . .
assum[ed] that the Amendment would do nothing more than enforce Article IV as traditionally understood”).
269 See Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 123, 138 (1986) (observing that “Bingham’s draft . . . did not directly supply authority for the kind of action [he] wanted to take,
nor did it, as Hotchkiss pointed out, directly forbid the states from doing that which Congress thought the states ought not to do” and crediting Hotchkiss with “showing exactly
where Bingham’s draft failed to secure its ends beyond the control of changeable congressional majorities”).
270 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
271 Id.
272 Id.
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first two drafts? In his speech, Bingham stated that Section 1 would “protect
by national law [(a)] the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the
Republic and [(b)] the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction
whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts
of any State.”273 Lash says:
In this passage, Bingham continues his longstanding practice of distinguishing the natural rights of all persons from the rights of citizens of the United
States. The rights of equal protection are “the inborn rights of every person,” whereas “citizens of the Republic” enjoy an additional set of national
privileges or immunities.274

Lash apparently bases this “equal protection” characterization on the
next paragraph, in which Bingham observes that “[n]o State ever had the
right, under the forms of law or otherwise, [(a)] to deny to any freeman the
equal protection of the laws or [(b)] to abridge the privileges or immunities
of any citizen of the Republic.”275 Presumably because the phrase “the privileges and immunities of . . . citizens of the Republic” is repeated in both
paragraphs almost (but not quite) verbatim, Lash thinks “the equal protection of the laws” in the second paragraph must connect with the “inborn
rights” mentioned in the previous sentence.
But this reading is inconsistent with Lash’s current theory of how the
rights identified in Corfield were to be protected. According to Lash, these
rights are protected as an “enumerated,” “Comity Clause” right not to be
discriminated against as an out-of-stater, not by the Equal Protection Clause.
Bingham may indeed be implying, contra Lash, that certain Corfield rights are
protected, not by the Privileges or Immunities Clause but by the Equal Protection Clause. Or Bingham may simply be referring to the differing protections offered by the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. These two paragraphs, read together, are ambiguous.
What about Bingham’s references to the “bill of rights”? We have seen
that the phrase “bill of rights” was not deployed by Bingham solely to refer to
what Lash regards as enumerated rights. Thus, in the course of defending
his initial proposal, Bingham had characterized the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV—which he described in 1859 as affording protection
to the (unenumerated) right to “work and enjoy the product of . . . toil”276—
as part of the “bill of rights.”277 We will see him later associate these rights
with the Declaration of Independence.
273 Id. at 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
274 LASH, supra note 28, at 150.
275 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
276 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham). In
that same speech, Bingham denied that “the majority of any republican State may, in any
way, rightfully restrict the humblest citizen of the United States in the free exercise of any
one of his natural rights; those rights common to all men, and to protect which . . . governments are instituted [among men].” Id.
277 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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True, Bingham discussed state violations of the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.278 But we cannot infer an ERO theory on Bingham’s part from this reference to the “express letter” of the Constitution,279 any more than we could infer an ERO theory on Attorney
General Butler’s part from his reference to the right to peaceable assembly
and petition in his 1835 letter. The enumeration by Bingham and Butler of
certain rights should not be construed as their denying the existence of
others retained by the people.
The same goes for Bingham’s assurance that the “extent” of his amendment encompassed only “protection by national law from unconstitutional
State enactments. . . . That is the extent it hath, no more.”280 This statement
should not be construed to imply that enumerated rights—and only enumerated rights—are protected “by national law” absent additional evidence that
Bingham considered only violations of enumerated personal rights to be
unconstitutional.
Put another way, an ERO interpretation of this sentence assumes what it
purports to prove. Moreover, the last time that Bingham deployed what
appears to be a quote from Othello 281—on February 28—he held an understanding of the “bill of rights” that included the unenumerated rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.282 If Bingham’s view of the
extent of the “bill of rights” changed so as to encompass only enumerated
rights, he did not say so.
Yet another dog that did not bark was Bingham’s failure, at any point, to
dispel the persistent controversy over whether the right to suffrage was
among the “privileges or immunities” of citizens by invoking an ERO understanding. It would have been easy enough for him to do so if that was the
consensus public meaning of a term-of-art “privileges or immunities.”
Bingham might simply have stated that the right to suffrage, being
unenumerated in the text of the Constitution, was obviously not among the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Instead, Bingham
advanced the considerably more complex argument that the “second section” of the proposed amendment—which contemplated that states could
deny suffrage to blacks, so long as they were willing to incur the penalty of
reduced congressional representation—“exclude[d] the conclusion that by
the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law.”283
278 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 2543.
281 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOORE OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3, ll. 80–82
(“[T]rue, I have married her, / The very head and front of my offending, / Hath this
extent, no more.”); see also GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 48–49 (2013) (explaining that
“[a] typical Bingham speech was filled with citations and scholarly allusions that few members of Congress could match” and that “[h]e was especially fond of history, Shakespeare,
and poetry”).
282 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088–89 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
283 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
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Still, the language of the proposed amendment did change, and the fact
that those changes apparently satisfied moderates and conservatives who had
raised concerns about Bingham’s initial proposal requires some explanation.
We offer the following alternative to Lash’s.
We have acknowledged that the comity-only view of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause dominated antebellum caselaw. Alternative views, however, were “on the table,” in the sense of being regarded as legally plausible.284 One in particular became increasingly ascendant in public discourse
in the context of debates over slavery. That view held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause established a floor of fundamental rights associated with
American citizenship that states could not abridge.285 We should not dismiss
this view simply because its advocates often drew upon antebellum opinions
that—as Lash has shown—are probably best read as expressing a comity-only
view of the Clause. As we will see, that’s not how they always were read by
antislavery Republicans.
Both antislavery and proslavery advocates gravitated towards fundamental-rights views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause over the course of
time. This convergence was driven in part by political imperatives. Antislavery advocates sought to secure the privileges of travel, economic pursuit, and
speech against increasingly racist laws enacted by southern, midwestern, and
western states. These laws were designed to exclude free blacks from state
borders, deny them economic opportunities, and stifle any criticism of the
“peculiar institution.”286
Proslavery advocates sought security for their property in enslaved people against increasingly stringent antislavery laws enacted by northern
states.287 They attempted to reduce to absurdity arguments for black citizenship by claiming that, if blacks were to be recognized as citizens, they would
be entitled under Article IV, Section 2 to vote and serve on juries everywhere,
as well as to enjoy other privileges and immunities that many whites were
determined to deny them.288 Both sides thus had compelling practical rea284 See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1703, 1733–35 (1997) (distinguishing between “off the wall” arguments that can be legally
dismissed and “on the table” arguments that are “not yet enshrined in positive constitutional doctrine” but are within the bounds of acceptable legal discourse).
285 For early antislavery examples, see, for example, REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF
COUNSEL IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLFF. IN ERROR, VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT 8
(Boston, Garrison & Knapp 1834); JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SLAVERY 84, 85–86 (Cleveland, J. Calyer 1849); and ROBERT C. WINTHROP, The Imprisonment of Free Colored Seamen: A Report Made to the House of Representatives of the
United States (Jan. 20, 1843), in ADDRESSES AND SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 343 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1852). For early proslavery examples, see Willard v. People, 5 Ill.
461, 471–72 (1843); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270, 272 (1833); and Lewis v. Fullerson, 22 Va.
15, 23 (1821).
286 See Upham, supra note 139, at 1130–39 (providing an overview of state efforts to
restrict the rights of blacks and antislavery whites during the 1840s and 1850s).
287 Id. at 1129.
288 Id. at 1145–50.
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sons to develop constitutional arguments for a national floor of fundamental
citizenship rights notwithstanding the comity-only reading of the clause prevailing in the courts.
Because the Thirty-Ninth Congress was dominated by Republicans, the
antislavery, fundamental-rights interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause merits closest attention. During the 1860 presidential campaign,
Republicans frequently argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause not
only forbade southern states from abridging the freedom of out-of-staters but
also from abridging the freedom of their own citizens. Thus, former Congressman Joshua Giddings, who was among the founders of the Republican
Party and was John Bingham’s friend and mentor,289 proposed the following
resolution at the National Republican Convention in May of 1860:
That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some
from their native states and others from the states of their adoption, and are
now exiled from their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the
Democratic party responsible for this gross violation of that clause of the
Constitution which declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.290

As David Upham has noted, this resolution—which was adopted unanimously291—saw the Republican Party “formally endors[ing] an absoluterights reading of the Clause, and one that would protect citizens even in their
own state.”292 The resolution’s focus on the freedom to express “opinions” is
understandable in view of the fact that southern censorship effectively prevented Republicans from campaigning in the South. But Republicans did
not understand the Privileges and Immunities Clause to be limited in its coverage to freedom of speech. Antislavery governors, legislators, jurists, and
editorialists affirmed that the rights to travel;293 to engage in lawful pursuits;294 to make contracts;295 and to be secure in their life, liberty, and property,296 were among the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
These antislavery advocates were not ignorant of the comity-only reading
of Article IV. Rather, they rejected it in favor of a reading that they viewed as
289 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 281, at 42 (describing how Giddings took Bingham “under
his wing” and “was his closest professional confidant”).
290 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS (Minneapolis, Charles W. Johnson 1893) (emphasis added).
291 John Hutchins, Reminiscences of the Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Congresses: XVIII, 13
MAG. W. HIST. 208, 208 (1890).
292 Upham, supra note 139, at 1153.
293 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1039–40 (1860) (statement of Rep.
William Perry); W.A. Larned, Negro Citizenship, in 15 NEW ENGLANDER 478, 518 (1857);
Alex. W. Randall, Governor’s Message (May 15, 1861), JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF WISCONSIN 4, 10 (May 1861); What Shall Be Done with the Negro?, THE NAT’L REPUBLICAN (Oct. 8,
1862), https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014760/1862-10-08/ed-1/seq-2/.
294 Randall, supra note 293, at 10.
295 See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 975 (1859) (statement of Rep. Dawes).
296 See DANIEL GARDNER, INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
480–83 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1860).
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more consistent with their understanding of U.S. citizenship297 and for
which they found some support in antebellum caselaw.298
For instance, in his monumental two-volume treatise on slavery, The Law
of Freedom and Bondage in the United States, antislavery jurist John Codman
Hurd dutifully recited cases in which courts “f[ound] the standard [of privilege and immunities] rather in the rights enjoyed by citizens domiciled in the
forum of jurisdiction, than in a national standard of privilege.”299 However,
Hurd then invoked Corfield 300 and—hard though it may be to believe it—
Chief Justice Taney’s dicta in Dred Scott v. Sandford 301 for the proposition that
there existed a fundamental-rights floor that no state could fall below in its
treatment of U.S. citizens.302
Hurd understood the Privileges and Immunities Clause to “continue the
pre-existing common law of the colonies so far as it contained a standard of
the rights of citizens of one locality appearing as domestic aliens within
another jurisdiction.”303 He therefore believed that there existed “some
297 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
71–93 (1951) (coining and elaborating the concept of “paramount national citizenship,”
according to which all U.S. citizens were bearers of fundamental rights that the federal
government was obliged to protect in return for citizens’ allegiance and were entitled to
equal treatment under the law vis-à-vis other citizens). For valuable discussions of the concept, see, for example, CURTIS, supra note 69, at 42–44, 81; Richard L. Aynes, supra note 69,
at 69; Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331,
375–80 (2010); Howard Jay Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV.
3, 5–18 (1954); Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 115, 121–32 (2010); and Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement
of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 725–29 (2003).
One of us has traced paramount national citizenship’s abolitionist roots. See Randy E.
Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?: The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 205–09, 224–29 (2011) (summarizing citizenship in the thought of
Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany).
298 The Ohio Supreme Court embraced the fundamental-rights view in 1844. See Wm.
H. Williams, The Arrest of Non-Residents for Debt—Constitutionality of the Law, 2 W.L.J. 265, 266
(1845). Judge Nathaniel Reed held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
designed “not to secure to the non-resident the same rights and indulgence with the resident in every State, but simply to secure to the citizen of the United States, whether a State
resident or not, the full enjoyment of all the rights of citizenship, in every State throughout
the Union.” Id. at 267. In so doing, he used the ellipsis formulation that fellow Ohioan
John Bingham would later deploy: “That ‘the citizens (of the United States) of each State,’
or belonging to each State, ‘shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
(of the United States) in the several States.’” Id. at 266.
299 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
352 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (footnote omitted).
300 Id. at 351 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230)).
301 Id. at 291–92, 347 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416–17,
428 (1856)). Lash’s argument that Taney intended to communicate a comity-only view is
persuasive. See LASH, supra note 28, at 40–42.
302 HURD, supra note 299, at 351.
303 Id. at 353.
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national and quasi-international standard of rights which are ‘fundamental
and belong of right to the citizens of free governments.’ ”304 Hurd and other
antislavery advocates305 thus used judicial opinions that Lash regards as comity-only opinions to support a fundamental-rights view of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
Lash nonetheless describes Bingham’s fundamental-rights view of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as idiosyncratic and contends that he was
forced to alter the language of the second draft because his colleagues
understood it to protect only comity rights. But the fundamental-rights view
was not idiosyncratic amongst Republicans, and Bingham’s changes admit of
a more plausible explanation.
In observing that Bingham’s changes satisfied his fellow Republicans,
Lash draws upon the research of Professor Earl Maltz, who identifies five
Republicans who “voiced federalism-based concerns regarding Bingham’s
initial proposal”—Roscoe Conkling, Thomas Davis, Hale, Hotchkiss, and William Stewart.306 We have already discussed the objections of Hale and
Hotchkiss.
Conkling said little, other than that he objected to the amendment for
reasons “entirely opposite to those[ ] given” by Hotchkiss and that he
thought “no objection is to be made to this proposed amendment because it
does not go far enough or because it is not sufficiently radical.”307 Davis
echoed Hale and Hotchkiss’s concerns that Bingham’s second draft would
grant Congress the power to enact “original legislation.”308 Stewart considered the language of privileges and immunities not to be “material” and
instead focused his critical attention on how the first proposal empowered
Congress to “make all the laws in all the States affecting the protection of
either life, liberty, or property, precisely similar.”309
Like Hale, Hotchkiss, and Davis, Stewart understood this to be an effective grant of primary power that would enable Congress to “legislate fully
upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property, and in this way secure
uniformity and equal protection to all persons in the several States.”310
Thus, all of the concerned federalists in this group who elaborated upon
their objections understood Bingham’s second draft to grant primary legisla304 Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted) (quoting, with minor variations, Corfield v. Coryell, 6
F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)).
305 See, e.g., Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 302–03, 306 (1866) (citing and quoting
Taney’s dicta and holding void state constitutional provisions that forbade blacks from
making contracts); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3032 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Henderson) (citing Taney’s dicta when discussing “all the personal rights, privileges, and
immunities” of U.S. citizenship); Larned, supra note 293, at 517–18 (endorsing Taney’s
definition of the “privilege[s] of a general citizenship in the United States” and describing
it as the “strongest portion of Judge Taney’s argument”).
306 MALTZ, supra note 19, at 94.
307 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling).
308 Id. at 1087 (statement of Rep. Davis).
309 Id. at 1082 (statement of Rep. Stewart).
310 Id.
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tive power to Congress and objected on the basis of this understanding. None
took issue with the language of privileges and immunities.
We have already suggested that the “primary power” problem with Bingham’s first two proposals stemmed from the grant of a capacious “necessary
and proper” legislative power in Congress. We think the best interpretation
of Bingham’s apparent success in satisfying Davis, Hale, Hotchkiss, and Stewart with his third proposal is that, by eliminating this grant of legislative
power, it plainly no longer conferred primary legislative power upon Congress. In addition, the third proposal, by adding “No state shall,” now plainly
did expressly prohibit states from engaging in discrimination, assuaging one
of Hotchkiss’s concerns.
As to Conkling, his change in position may have had nothing to do with
the changed language. He appears to have opposed even Bingham’s third
and final draft until the very end of the Joint Committee’s deliberations,
when it became clear both that Bingham’s final draft would be part of the
proposed amendment and that the amendment would pass the House.311
To attribute Bingham’s success in satisfying concerned fellow federalists
to the language of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
is to blink the reality that none of those federalists raised concerns about the
original language of “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states” in the first place, and other changes in the language were responsive
to the concerns that Davis, Hale, Hotchkiss, and Stewart actually did raise.
Suppose, however, that Lash is correct that Bingham’s language change
was inspired by his concern that the language of Article IV would have been
understood only to refer to comity rights. Lash would still need to demonstrate that Bingham’s new language was understood to secure absolute protection only for enumerated rights. We have seen that Lash’s case for the
status of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” as a term
of art denoting all-and-only enumerated rights is weak. But, perhaps Lash’s
ERO theory was somehow communicated in the course of congressional
debate or during the ratification process.
We have already noted that Bingham never drew upon treaty jurisprudence when explaining his revised language. Lash adduces no evidence that
anyone during the congressional debate made the connection between Bingham’s revised language and antebellum treaty jurisprudence. When legislators mentioned treaties, they did so in connection with the citizenship

311 Zuckert, supra note 269, at 146 (“The evidence from the journal of the Joint Committee . . . shows that Conkling had opposed Bingham’s drafts all along, even after they
were recast into the ‘no state shall’ form; and that he finally gave Bingham his support only
towards the very end of the Committee’s deliberations, when it was well assured that Bingham’s draft would be part of the proposed amendment, and then, in the House, when it
was clear that the amendment would pass easily.”).
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declaration in the Civil Rights Act of 1866312 and Howard’s later-proposed
Citizenship Clause, not the Privileges or Immunities Clause.313
Lash might reply that the connection was so obvious that no one considered it necessary to mention it. But, as we have seen, it is not obvious that the
connection would have been obvious. Lash has failed to show that any enumerated-rights-based theory exerted a substantial influence on antebellum
jurisprudence, to say nothing of the particular ERO theory on which he rests
his thesis.
Which brings us, once more, to Howard’s May 23 introduction of the
third and final version of the Clause with which we began this Article. Nothing in this speech seems, on its face, to have been intended by Howard to
communicate an ERO understanding. To the contrary, Howard’s reference
to “a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights” suggests no differentiation
between those rights which are “secured by the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution”—which he mentions first—and those which are
secured “by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”314
Lash reads Howard as drawing upon Justice Washington’s discussion of
Article IV privileges and immunities in Corfield only for the purpose of
explaining that “citizens of the United States had a right of equal access to a
limited set of state-conferred rights when traveling to a state other than their
home state.”315
Lash emphasizes that Howard concludes his quotation from Corfield by
explaining that “[s]uch is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution” and
only then states that “[t]o these privileges and immunities, whatever they may
be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and
precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and
secured by the first eight amendments.”316
This framing, Lash contends, served to distinguish the right to comity
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause from the enumerated
rights protected by the first eight amendments and to communicate that only
the latter rights would be absolutely protected.317
This reading is unpersuasive. To what did Howard intend that the “personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments” be
312 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1756 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (referring to treaties making citizens of the people of Texas and the people of Florida, a treaty with the Stockbridge Indians, and the Louisiana Cession Act); id. at 1832
(statement of Rep. Lawrence) (referring to a number of treaties, including the Louisiana
Cession Act, indicating that “the nation may by solemn act of Congress, or even by treaty,
declare that classes of people collectively, shall be citizens”).
313 Id. at 498 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (referring to treaties with Native American
tribes).
314 Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard).
315 LASH, supra note 28, at 159.
316 Id. at 157–58 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement
of Sen. Howard)).
317 Id. at 159, xi.
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“added,” if not to the family of “privileges and immunities” described by Justice Washington? Howard proceeded to describe a “mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution . . . some by the first eight amendments” and to
state as fact “that all these immunities, privileges, rights . . . do not operate in
the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation.”318
Referring interchangeably to privileges, immunities, and rights, and
grouping all such privileges, immunities, and rights—whether associated with
Article IV or set forth in the first eight amendments—together in a “mass”
strike us as incredibly obscure ways to communicate a critically important
distinction between, on the one hand, state-conferred “privileges and immunities” protected solely against discrimination when sojourning in another
state and, on the other hand, national “privileges or immunities” to be protected absolutely against state infringement.
Moreover, when one considers that Howard’s reference to the first eight
amendments was apparently inserted into his speech as an additional passage—suggesting he originally was going to refer only to Corfield rights—it
becomes even less likely that the extended discussion of Corfield was calculated only to explain the reach of one enumerated right: the “Comity Clause”
right of nondiscrimination against sojourning citizens.319 Indeed, after the
inserted pages 2a and 2b, page 3 of Howard’s notes then continue: “By the
first clause each state is prohibited from restricting these fundamental civil
rights of citizens, whatever may be their nature or extent.”320
Assuming page 3 was originally written to follow page 2 on which Corfield
is discussed, Howard was referring to the rights in Corfield as “these fundamental civil rights of citizens.” This inference is strengthened by his qualifying this by “whatever may be their nature or extent,” which in the published
version of the speech is explicitly a reference to Corfield rights. That Howard
characterized these as “civil rights” also explains how Republicans came to
understand the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that secured the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under Section 5, and independently
protected the rights listed therein in the event that the Act was repealed.321
318 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphases added).
319 Corfield is referenced on page “2” of his handwritten notes. The rights in the first
eight amendments are then inserted on pages “2a” and “2b” before the speech resumes on
page “3.” See Notes of Jacob Howard on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause (1866) [hereinafter Notes of Jacob Howard], http://www.tifis.org/sources/
Howard.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6HA-X2YK]. This observation was first made by Green.
See Green, supra note 19, at 109 n.96.
320 Notes of Jacob Howard, supra note 319, at 3.
321 Indeed, at least one newspaper reported on Howard’s speech as if his discussion
concerned only Corfield rights. The Boston Daily Advertiser told its readers:
The Senate having taken up the amendment, Mr. Howard explained it, section by section. The first clause of the first section was intended to secure to the
citizens of all the States the privileges which are in their nature fundamental, and
which belong of right to all persons in a free gouernment [sic]. There was now
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Lash seeks support for his conclusion that Howard intended to communicate an ERO understanding from his subsequent opposition to the placement of conditions on the admission of Nebraska to the Union. Howard
opposed conditioning Nebraska’s statehood on its granting blacks the right
to vote.322 But Howard explained that his opposition was based on his disagreement with the “principle” that “under that clause of the Constitution
which declares that the Congress may admit new States into this Union, it is
competent for Congress to annex as fundamental conditions any requirements
that Congress may see fit . . . to remain in force as law forever.”323
Howard understood congressional power over admission more narrowly
as a power to “invest [admitted] States . . . with every power, every faculty,
every constitutional provision which pertains to any of the States in the
Union under the Constitution.”324 The admission power did not include the
power to prevent states from legislating in ways that Congress deemed inexpedient, indeed, to enact “entire code[s] of laws” in order to “mak[e] provision for every exigency that arises in society.”325
In sum, Howard was opposing a principle that would grant Congress
primary legislative power over newly admitted states. There is no tension
between opposing that principle and supporting an amendment that would
empower Congress to ensure that a limited set of enumerated and
unenumerated rights sharing a certain family resemblance326 are not violated by states—whether they be newly admitted or have been in the Union
since the Founding.
no power in the Constitution to enforce its guarantees of those rights. They
stood simply as declarations, and the States were not restricted from violating
them, except by their own local constitutions and laws. The great object of the
first section, fortified by the fifth, was to compel the States to observe these guarantees, and to throw the same shield over the black man as over the white, over
the humble as over the powerful.
Dixon, Reconstruction: The Debate in the Senate, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1866, at 1.
Moreover, this was decidedly not a comity-only reading of either Howard’s speech or the
Amendment itself.
322 LASH, supra note 28, at 160.
323 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (emphasis added).
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65–71, at 35–38
(P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., Wiley-Blackwell
Publishing, rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953) (characterizing the similarities between “games” as
“family resemblances” on the ground that “the various resemblances between members of
a family—build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament . . . overlap and criss-cross in
the same way”). Wittgenstein’s general point is that “the instances to which a word or
concept applies a[re] connected not by a common property but by ‘relevant resemblances’” and that we should “look for meaning not in an inchoate intelligible essence, but
in the use to which words are put in a discourse.” Dennis M. Patterson, Interpretation in
Law—Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671, 684–85 (1984) (discussing Wittgenstein).
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Furthermore, there is also no evidence that Bingham and Howard were
understood by their colleagues to be communicating an ERO understanding,
whatever they may have privately intended. We can safely set Democrats’
expansive interpretations of Bingham’s language aside, given their compelling political incentives to misrepresent the meaning of that language in
order to defeat the proposed amendment. But we also find no Republican
supporters of Section 1 voicing a clear ERO understanding, even though it
might have enabled them to refute Democratic arguments that the amendment would guarantee voting rights to blacks.
Howard, for instance, contended that the right to suffrage had been
“always . . . regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not
regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society
and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic].”327 On Lash’s account, we can only conclude that Republicans
wasted a tremendous amount of time and courted unnecessary risk by failing
to avail themselves of a comparatively cheap means of making plain that enumerated rights were categorically “in” and unenumerated rights categorically
“out.”
C. Coming to Grips with the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Proponents of Section 1 frequently referred to the Civil Rights Act and
claimed that it would be constitutionalized by Section 1.328 On Lash’s
account, it is hard to see how the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have
done so. Recall that the Act guaranteed the rights “to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, . . . and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.”329 None of these rights are enumerated as such in the first eight
amendments or elsewhere in the text.330
327 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
328 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599–600 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull); id. at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens);
id. at 2883 (statement of Rep. Latham). For additional references, see JACOBUS TENBROEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW 224 n.11 (1965). See also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 75 (1992) (“It was the demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘constitutionalized’ the Civil Rights Act of
1866.”); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1389 (1992) (“Virtually everyone agrees that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended at least to empower Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
329 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
330 Although Lash might balk at “unenumerated” because he now believes that these
rights are protected by the enumerated right to due process of law, we can think of no
better term to describe the fact that these rights are not listed, catalogued, or otherwise
expressly mentioned in the text of the amended federal Constitution. See WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 759 (1966) (first definition of ‘enumerate’: “count”; second definition: “list”; first definition of ‘enumeration’: “catalog”; second definition: “numbering” or “counting”); Enumerate, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2010) (first
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Moreover, the Act did not merely protect those unenumerated rights
listed in the Act’s text against parochial discrimination. It also guaranteed
that all citizens would have “the same right . . . [to contract, property, security] as is enjoyed by white citizens,” regardless of state citizenship.331 On Lash’s
account, then, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was not understood in a
way that would give this legislation constitutional safe harbor.
And yet, not only did members of Congress widely assert that Section 1
was meant to so empower Congress, but Congress reenacted the Civil Rights
Act in 1870 to ensure its constitutionality.332 As we noted above, in his notes
for his speech, Jacob Howard appears to have referred to the rights identified
in Corfield as “fundamental civil rights.”333
Although Lash has questioned the connection between the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and Section 1, noting in particular that John Bingham opposed
the former despite his central role in framing the latter,334 he has never
denied that Section 1 did constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, he
has put forward no less than four theories of how Section 1 constitutionalized
the Civil Rights Act since adopting the ERO understanding. The first three
of these theories were not fully developed.
Theory #1: The Privileges or Immunities Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act.
In Lash’s second article articulating his ERO theory, he wrote that “many
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress (though apparently not John Bingham) looked to the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing a source of federal authority to pass the Civil Rights Act” and affirmed that “[e]nsuring that
Congress had such power to enforce the equality principles of Article IV (and
thus authorize the Civil Rights Act) was one of the concerns driving the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”335
But again, a mere Comity Clause could not have authorized an Act that
forbade states from discriminating against their own citizens. And Lash did
not demonstrate that, by 1868, the Privileges and Immunities Clause had
become associated with “equality principles” that forbade states from discrimination against their own citizens.
Theory #2: The Citizenship Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act. In his
book, Lash hedged on whether Bingham’s third and final draft would have
constitutionalized the 1866 Act. He points out that whereas the third draft
“addressed substantive national ‘privileges or immunities,’ including the
Comity Clause rights of visiting out-of-state citizens[, t]he Civil Rights Act . . .
definition: “mention (a number of things) one by one”; second definition: “establish the
number of”).
331 Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
332 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
333 Notes of Jacob Howard, supra note 319, at 3.
334 See LASH, supra note 28, at 114 (questioning the conventional wisdom that “the
Fourteenth Amendment represented a consensus attempt to constitutionalize the Civil
Rights Act” and highlighting Bingham’s opposition to it).
335 Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II, supra note 27, at 395,
407 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
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addressed equality rights that residents could assert against their own
state.”336 Lash also raised doubts about whether the Equal Protection Clause
might cover the Act, citing Professor Christopher Green’s research for the
proposition that the latter Clause “spoke of equal protection of laws, not equal
laws.”337
Instead, Lash claimed that it was the Citizenship Clause of Section
1338—proposed by Howard on May 30, 1866, just shy of three weeks after
Bingham’s presentation of his third draft to the House339—that “constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”340 Lash did not, however, explain
how the Clause’s “definition of national and state citizenship” incorporated
equality principles that were broad enough to authorize Congress to forbid
intrastate discrimination.341
Theory #3: The Equal Protection Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act. In a
2015 essay, Lash responded to journalist Damon Root’s claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects unenumerated economic rights.342
Although Lash agreed that the “Fourteenth Amendment protects unenumerated . . . economic rights,” he claimed that Root “ignore[d] the difference
between substantive rights and equal protection.”343 Lash agreed with Root
that economic rights—including those listed in the 1866 Act—were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But he now insisted that they were
protected by means of an “equal protection clause that protected all per336 LASH, supra note 28, at 170.
337 Id. at 171 (first citing Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection
Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Green, PreEnactment History]; and then citing Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal)
Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 219
(2009)).
338 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”).
339 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
340 LASH, supra note 28, at 171.
341 Id. at 174. We hasten to add that other scholars have elaborated such arguments.
See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493,
500 (2013); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship
Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 283 (2000). Lash does not
engage with this scholarship.
342 Root’s view was presented in DAMON ROOT, OVERRULED: THE LONG WAR FOR CONTROL OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 27–30 (2014). The exchange was prompted by Lash’s
critical two-part review of the book. For the review, see Kurt T. Lash, Fighting Federalism:
Damon Root’s Overruled (Part One), LAW & LIBERTY (July 9, 2015), https://www.lawliberty
.org/2015/07/09/fighting-federalism-damon-roots-overruled-part-one/; and Kurt T. Lash,
A Tale of Two Clauses: Damon Root’s Overruled (Part Two), LAW & LIBERTY (July 10, 2015),
https://www.lawliberty.org/2015/07/10/a-tale-of-two-clauses-damon-roots-overruled-parttwo/. For Root’s initial response, see Damon Root, Yes, the 14th Amendment Protects Economic
Liberty, REASON (July 13, 2015) (arguing for protection of “unenumerated economic
rights”), http://reason.com/blog/2015/07/13/yes-the-14th-amendment-protectseconomic.
343 Lash, supra note 43.
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sons,” rather than by a Privileges or Immunities Clause that “absolutely” guaranteed the enjoyment of those rights.344
In effect, Lash treated the Equal Protection Clause as a generalized
antidiscrimination guarantee. Lash omitted mention of a Comity Clause
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (Theory #1) and no longer
referred to the Citizenship Clause (Theory #2). He also dismissed a suggestion—made by one of us345—that the Due Process of Law Clause might protect unenumerated rights.346
Although the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause is treated as a generalized antidiscrimination guarantee in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, Lash’s originalist commitments required more support for his 2015
claims than he provided. A number of scholars have adduced evidence that
the Equal Protection Clause was not originally understood as a generalized
antidiscrimination guarantee but, rather, as a guarantee of equal access to
the remedial functions of the courts and equal treatment by law
enforcement.347
If these scholars are correct, the Equal Protection Clause might constitutionalize certain features of the 1866 Act—in particular, it might reach the
right to “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property”348—but it would likely not constitutionalize others, like
the rights to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,”349 which do not relate to either the remedial functions of
the courts or to treatment by law enforcement. Lash did not rebut this narrower view of the Clause’s coverage in either his book or his criticisms of
Root.
Theory #4: The Due Process of Law Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act. Having previously asserted the other three operative provisions of Section 1 as a
constitutional authority for the 1866 Act, Lash has now shifted to a theory
based on the fourth—a theory he had briefly dismissed in 2015. In 2018,
after his book on the Privileges or Immunities Clause appeared, Lash published an article setting forth a more developed theory that, after all, the Act
was constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause.350
Lash adduced evidence that Republican supporters of the Act like Representative James Wilson and Senator Lyman Trumbull understood the Fifth
344 Id.
345 Bernick, supra note 45.
346 See Lash, supra note 43 (“My review did not address the Due Process Clause because
not even Damon Root had the courage to try and resuscitate this broadly mocked
doctrine.”).
347 See Alfred Avins, The Equal “Protection” of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12
N.Y.L.F. 385, 415 (1966); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws—A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 526 (1985); Harrison, supra note 328, at 1435–36;
Green, Pre-Enactment History, supra note 337, at 220.
348 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
349 Id.
350 Lash, supra note 39.
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Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause to embody the Declaration of Independence’s references to “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” and to
provide authority to protect “fundamental rights belonging to every man as a
free man.”351 Lash emphasized that the Civil Rights Act originally provided
for the protection of “all persons,” not merely citizens, and argued that,
although the Act’s scope was altered because of moderate misgivings about
Congress’s constitutional authority to protect all persons, the Act was always
understood to be a means of ensuring the due process of law.
Lash also detailed how, after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment removed any doubt about the constitutionality of protecting what Lash
awkwardly describes as the “natural rights of due process,”352 John Bingham—who had initially opposed the Act—voted for the Act’s reenactment
through the Enforcement Act of 1870.353 The authority for this reenactment, Lash argues, was supplied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. As we will discuss below, section 18 of the Enforcement
Act provided that the 1866 Act was “hereby re-enacted.”354 Section 16 of the
Enforcement Act, in language that closely resembled that of the 1866 Act,
extended to “all persons” many—though not all—of the rights protected by
the 1866 Act.355
We agree with Lash that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause places limits on the content or substance of state legislation. We
have elsewhere argued that state legislators are bound by the Clause to pursue constitutionally proper ends related to the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and that federal judges are required by the Clause to evaluate
whether legislation is designed to achieve such ends or is instead arbitrary.356
So, it seems obvious to us that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected some
rights to life, liberty, and property that all people are entitled to enjoy and
that the Due Process of Law Clause safeguards against arbitrary deprivation.
It is unclear to us, however, why Lash finds it politically plausible that a Due
Process of Law Clause that was understood to authorize the federal protec351 Id. at 1422–28 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476
(1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)).
352 Id. at 1448. This label appears to be his own innovation. We think that it is awkward because due process of law presupposes an operating government with judicial
processes in which law is applied—something that does not exist in the “state of nature”
and the absence of which is one of that state’s primary inconveniences. See JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 125 (1689) (“In the State of Nature there wants a known
and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law.”). It is accurate to say that due process of law protects natural life, liberty, and
property rights—it is, in our view, incorrect to say that it is itself a natural right. Rather, it
is a civil right. See BARNETT, supra note 45, at 63.
353 Lash, supra note 39, at 1456.
354 Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (“[T]he act to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication,
passed April nine, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted . . . .”).
355 Id. § 16.
356 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 31, at 1605.
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tion of the “fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man”357
somehow made it through the Article V process but a Privileges or Immunities Clause that was understood to protect constitutionally unenumerated
rights that only citizens are entitled to enjoy would not have met with similar
success.
Lash might respond by pointing to his caveat that “[t]he precise content
and scope of due process during the antebellum and Reconstruction period
remains . . . under scholarly dispute.”358 He has hedged his constitutional
bets, stating only that “there was [a] clear . . . core meaning” of due process
of law that included the “equal right to due process” and “a judicially
enforced set of fair procedures” prior to deprivation.359 Yet, if the Due Process of Law Clause guaranteed only equal access to fair legal procedures, however, we do not see how Lash could claim that it provided constitutional
authority for either the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or sections 16 and 18 of the
Enforcement Act.
Just as the Civil Rights Act was concerned with more than comity, so, too,
was it concerned with more than equal access to fair legal procedures. Consider the “Black Codes,” uncontroversially among the primary targets of the
Act. The Codes were enacted in ex-Confederate states in mid-1865 to keep
blacks in a state of constructive servitude.360 To accomplish this, they denied
blacks the freedom to travel, the freedom to engage in honest work on mutually agreeable terms, the freedom to marry across the color line, and even the
freedom to leave home without permission.361 Equal access to fair legal procedures would mitigate, but not provide for the elimination of, the evils associated with laws that required blacks to provide written evidence of
employment, forfeited their wages if they broke the yearly contracts that were
imposed upon them, or forbade them from leaving the South in the hopes of
escaping social and economic oppression.362
That the 1866 Act was understood to be directed at more than unfair
legal process is evident in its advocates’ description of it. When Trumbull
characterized the Civil Rights Act as an effort to “destroy all the[ ] discriminations” in the Black Codes, he provided the following list of laws “in the late
slaveholding States” that deprived people of the “privileges which are essential to freemen”:
357 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
(emphasis added).
358 Lash, supra note 39, at 1400.
359 Id.
360 For discussions of the Black Codes, see, for example, W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 149–60 (2007); DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION (2014); FONER, supra note 195, at 189–208; JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF
SLAVERY 45–61 (2006); and C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 22–25
(1955).
361 EGERTON, supra note 360, at 178–82.
362 Id. at 179.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL201.txt

560

unknown

Seq: 62

notre dame law review

7-JAN-20

14:29

[vol. 95:2

They provide that if any colored person, any free negro or mulatto, shall
come into that State for the purpose of residing there, he shall be sold into
slavery for life. If any person of African descent residing in that State travels
from one county to another without having a pass or a certificate of his freedom, he is liable to be committed to jail and to be dealt with as a person who
is in the State without authority. Other provisions of the statute prohibit any
negro or mulatto from having fire-arms; and one provision of the statute
declares that for “exercising the functions of a minister of the Gospel free
negroes and mulattoes, on conviction, may be punished by any number of
lashes not exceeding thirty-nine on the bare back, and shall pay the costs.”
Other provisions of the statute of Mississippi prohibit a free negro or
mulatto from keeping a house of entertainment, and subject him to trial
before two justices of the peace and five slaveholders for violating the provisions of this law. The statutes of South Carolina make it a highly penal
offense for any person, white or colored, to teach slaves; and similar provisions are to be found running through all the statutes of the late slaveholding States.363

Certain of these laws—like the provision for blacks who kept houses of
entertainment to be tried before slaveowners—could be targeted by guaranteeing equal access to fair legal proceedings. But it seems clear that others—
like the prohibition against blacks keeping houses of entertainment in the
first place—would not be.
Lash highlights the expansive, natural-rights-saturated language that Wilson, Trumbull, and others used in describing the rights that the Act would
protect. But he does not seek to resolve the apparent tension between this
language and the specific laws that the Act’s supporters sought to target, on
the one hand, and a fair-legal-procedure-only reading of the Due Process of
Law Clause, on the other. Nor does he articulate the theory of due process
of law that they held.
The language used by the Act’s supporters in connection with the due
process of law seems to us to be consistent with an understanding that the
due process of law prohibited all legislation that deprived people of life, liberty, or property arbitrarily—that is, all legislation that was not designed to
promote the public good by securing and enlarging people’s enjoyment of
their natural rights.364 But such an understanding would seem to require
inquiry into content or substance of legislation, and Lash has dismissed “substantive” due process in the past.365
Lash also does not reckon with Republican responses to President Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act, which focused on the rights of citizens
rather than those of all persons. Consider Representative William Law363 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
364 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 31.
365 See Lash, Two Movements, supra note 33; see also Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 482 (2010) (describing James Wilson’s
statements in connection with the 1866 Act—including statements upon which Lash
relies—as “express[ing] clear support for a substantive conception of due process rights”).
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rence’s speech—excerpted by Lash—calling upon Congress to overrule President Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act:
All the law-writers agree that every citizen has certain “absolute rights,”
which include—
“The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the
right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered and frequently declared by the people of this country to be natural,
inherent, and inalienable.”—1 Kent’s Commentaries, 599; Federalist No. 84.
....
The bill of rights to the national Constitution declares that:
“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.”
....
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.
These are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights,
there are others, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase,
hold, and enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of
person and property.366

Even as Lawrence drew upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause, with its reference to “person[s],” he emphasized the Act’s connection to citizenship. Thus, he affirmed the existence of a “national citizenship” that “implie[d] certain rights which are to be protected” and stated that
the Act merely declared “what is already the constitutional rights of every
citizen in every State.”367
Lawrence’s most extensive discussion of the constitutional authority for
the Civil Rights Act involved not the Due Process of Law Clause but the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the nation in the
enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and property, and the
means essential to that end, by penal enactments to enforce the observance
of the provisions of the Constitution, article four, section two, and the equal
civil rights which it recognizes or by implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State.
Congress has the incidental power to enforce and protect the equal
enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are inherent in national citizenship. The Constitution declares these civil rights to be inherent in every citizen, and Congress has power to enforce the declaration. If it has not, then
the Declaration of Rights is in vain, and we have a Government powerless to
secure or protect rights which the Constitution declares every citizen shall
have. . . .
366 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)
(emphasis added).
367 Id. at 1832, 1836 (emphasis added).
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The Constitution declares that—
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.”368

Trumbull similarly responded to Johnson’s veto by focusing on the
rights of citizens:
[W]hat rights do citizens of the United States have? To be a citizen of the
United States carries with it some rights; and what are they? They are those
inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all
countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to
them in all the States of the Union. The right of American citizenship
means something.369

Trumbull did not so much as mention due process of law.
When Republicans did speak at length about due process of law in connection with the 1866 Act, their emphasis on what Lawrence called “natural,
inherent, and inalienable” rights makes it difficult to believe that they understood due process of law to guarantee only fair legal proceedings. If a “substantive” understanding of due process of law was widely held and
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause,
the Clause would not only have constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act but
empowered the federal government to ensure that states did not henceforth
arbitrarily deprive people of a variety of unenumerated rights that had once
been left in the care of the states.
This would be difficult to square with Lash’s account of what was politically possible in 1868. If Lash is right that Due Process of Law encompassed
Lawrence’s “absolute rights,” then Lash seems less likely to be right about the
Privileges or Immunities Clause being sellable to moderate Republicans only
because it was understood to leave unenumerated rights to the states. Simply
put, Lash cannot have a broad, unenumerated-rights-protective Due Process
of Law Clause and a narrow, enumerated-rights-only Privileges or Immunities
Clause and be right about Republican moderation.
Lash’s claim that the Due Process of Law Clause alone provided constitutional authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its subsequent repassage
in the Enforcement Act also faces considerable difficulties. As noted above,
section 18 specifically states that the 1866 Act is “hereby re-enacted.”370 Section 16, however, confers a bundle of rights that are similar but not identical
to those conferred by the 1866 Act. Compare the language of the 1866 Act
to that of section 16 of the Enforcement Act:
1866: “[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
368
369
370

Id. at 1835 (emphases added).
Id. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
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property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.”371
1870: “[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.”372

The italicized language was redacted. Why?
There is a compelling reason to believe that the redaction was a product
of the change from “citizens” in 1866 to “all persons” in 1870.373 Lash
acknowledges that “aliens” did not enjoy the same property rights as did “subjects” at common law,374 thanks to a doctrine that tied certain rights to allegiance to the king.375 Among other things, the former could acquire and
possess land but not hold “full” fee simple title.376
Although the doctrine of allegiance was amended to fit the American
context—“subjects,” for instance, became “citizens,” and allegiance to the
king became allegiance to the state377—the linkage between allegiance and
landholding rights was maintained in the decades following the Revolution,378 endured throughout the antebellum period,379 and persisted during
the most open period of immigration in the nation’s history.380 As Professor
Polly Price has detailed, “exclusionary [landholding] practices . . . underl[ay]
even . . . a period in which the opportunity to become an American citizen
was available to all comers of the white race.”381
Lash claims that “distinguishing the real property rights of citizens and
noncitizens f[ell] comfortably within the Reconstruction-era understanding
of the rights of due process.”382 Indeed, he states that this distinction
371 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added).
372 Enforcement Act of 1870, § 16, 16 Stat. at 144.
373 Lash, supra note 39, at 1455 n.244.
374 Id. at 1464–65.
375 See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the
Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 157 (1999).
376 Id. at 156–57.
377 Id. at 157.
378 Id. at 159.
379 See id. at 196.
380 See id. at 204–05.
381 Id. at 208. Nothing in this discussion should be construed as an endorsement of the
political theory that undergirded the doctrine of allegiance, nor of its exclusionary
consequences.
382 Lash, supra note 39, at 1464.
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“explains why the 1866 Civil Rights Act demanded citizens be granted the
equal right to ‘hold’ real property, but the 1870 extension demanded only
that all persons enjoy the general natural rights of ‘person and property.’”383
Lash draws upon Professor Ryan Williams’s scholarship, which argues
that due process of law was originally understood to incorporate common-law
distinctions and that the common law extended landholding rights to citizens that it did not extend to noncitizens. Because of this, Lash argues, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress could have understood the Due Process of
Law Clauses to require the protection of citizens’ landholding rights but not
to require the protection of noncitizens’ landholding rights.384
If the 1870 redaction of the rights listed in the 1866 Act was indeed
predicated upon the recognition that Congress was not obliged to guarantee
to noncitizens equality with respect of all the rights listed in the 1866 Act but
was obliged to guarantee equality with respect of some of them, Lash’s claim
that the Due Process of Law Clause supplied authority for the 1866 Act would
not necessarily be undermined by the Act’s inclusion of landholding rights.
The Due Process of Law Clause could have been understood to constitutionalize the 1866 Act’s repassage and the extension of a smaller set of rights to
noncitizens in 1870.
But, unless and until Lash clearly articulates the theory of the due process of law that he believes a critical mass of Republicans held, shows that
they did in fact hold it, and explains how it constitutionalized the 1866 Act,
his claim that it did so will remain unproven. As it stands, we have an 1866
Act that refers only to the rights of citizens; that was forcefully defended in
terms of the right of citizens; that protects landholding rights that had traditionally been denied to noncitizens; that was repassed without alteration as
part of legislation that also extended a nearly identical bundle of rights to
noncitizens—landholding rights conspicuously excepted.
Further, William Stewart, who introduced the 1870 bill in the Senate in
part to extend the equal protection of the laws to Asian immigrants, made
clear that he understood the distinction between citizen and alien landholding rights to be constitutionally significant.385 Consider the following
exchange between Stewart and fellow Republican Senator Charles Pomeroy:
Mr. POMEROY. I have not examined this bill, and I desire to ask the
Senator from Nevada a question. I understand him to say that this bill gave
the same civil rights to all persons in the United States which are enjoyed by
citizens of the United States. Is that it?
Mr. STEWART. No; it gives all the protection of the laws. If the Senator
will examine this bill in connection with the original civil rights bill, he will
see that it has no reference to inheriting or holding real estate.
383 Id. at 1465 (footnote omitted) (first quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27, 27; and then quoting Enforcement Act of 1870, §16, 16 Stat. 140, 144).
384 Id. at 1443 n.196 (citing Williams, supra note 341, at 496).
385 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1869) (resolution requesting the Judiciary
Committee to investigate whether legislation was required to enforce treaty obligations and
the Equal Protection Clause); Harrison, supra note 328, at 1444 & n.240.
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Mr. POMEROY. That is what I was coming to.
Mr. STEWART. The civil rights bill had several other things applying to
citizens of the United States. This simply extends to foreigners, not citizens,
the protection of our laws where the State laws deny them the equal civil
rights enumerated in the first section [of S. 365].
Mr. POMEROY. They have the same civil rights in that regard. Does
the property of a foreigner dying here descend under our laws? Most of the
States appoint a public administrator who administers upon the estates of
foreigners differently from what he does on the estates of citizens. Does this
interfere with that?
Mr. STEWART. I think not.
Mr. POMEROY. Foreigners are not allowed to petition the Senate. If
the bill passes, will the petitions of foreigners be received here?
....
[Mr. STEWART.] It has nothing to do with property or descent. We
left that part of the law out; but it gives protection to life and property here.
The civil rights bill, then, will give the United States courts jurisdiction to
enforce.386

Stewart thus communicated that the extension of a smaller bundle of
rights to noncitizens rested upon two constitutional premises: (1) citizens
have civil rights that noncitizens do not; (2) all people are entitled to the
equal protection of the laws.387 In contending that the 1866 Act was constitutionalized by a Due Process of Law Clause, the text of which draws no distinction between citizens and noncitizens—as John Bingham repeatedly
emphasized—Lash faces an uphill battle.388
Why is it so important that Lash prove his Due Process of Law claim? It
is important because he cannot explain how an enumerated-rights-includingcomity-rights Privileges or Immunities Clause could supply the authority to
prevent states from discriminating against their own citizens. If he is right
about the Privileges or Immunities Clause and wrong about the Due Process
of Law Clause, it follows that leading Republicans were wrong to claim that
the Fourteenth Amendment would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of
1866. As the 1866 Act was widely supported by moderates and radicals and
was believed to be central to the achievement of shared Republican goals,

386 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870).
387 See id.
388 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140 (1857) (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (“The Constitution provides . . . that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. It makes no distinction either on account of
complexion or birth . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1292 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“[I]n respect to life and liberty and property,
the people by their Constitution declared the equality of all men, and by express limitation
forbade the Government of the United States from making any discrimination.”).
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and Republicans frequently claimed that Section 1 would secure the 1866
Act’s constitutionality, the latter proposition is profoundly implausible.389
We are not demanding that Lash provide a comprehensive theory of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and refuse to budge from
it. In the future, however, it would be helpful if he explained in greater
detail how and why he has updated his prior beliefs about the Fourteenth
Amendment, and if he both acknowledge and explain any changes in his
views concerning how the 1866 Act was constitutionalized.
If in the end he concludes that the Due Process of Law Clause is limited
to providing equal access to fair legal proceedings to all people, he should
reconcile that conclusion with his 2018 belief that the Due Process of Law
Clause constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which seems to guarantee more than fair legal proceedings and to secure rights that all people were
not in 1868 understood to be constitutionally entitled to enjoy.
If, in the end, he concludes that its coverage is broader, he should reconcile that conclusion with his 2014 pessimism about the prospects of an
unenumerated-rights-protective Privileges or Immunities Clause being ratified into law. It seems implausible that moderate Republicans who, Lash
insisted, had federalism-related concerns about empowering the federal
courts and Congress to secure the unenumerated rights of U.S. citizens
would have signed off on a Due Process of Law Clause that empowered the
federal government to secure unenumerated natural rights belonging to all
people.

389 Suppose Lash went one step further to claim that parts of both the 1866 Act and the
Enforcement Act were unconstitutional, insofar as they protected unenumerated rights
that were unconnected with legal process. Such a claim would be deeply implausible. We
have mentioned repeated Republican representations that the Fourteenth Amendment
would constitutionalize the 1866 Act and the shared Republican commitment to the abolition of the Black Codes, which did not—as we have seen—solely target legal process rights.
Although the expected applications of constitutional text are not dispositive of original
meaning, one should hesitate before attributing meaning to text that contradicts its framers’ and supporters’ public explanations of the text’s implications for highly salient legislation and that would thwart the accomplishment of their public-articulated goals.
Further, Lash presents Bingham as an almost unerringly reliable source of interpretive
information after his embrace of a comity-only view of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. On his account, if anyone would have been in a position to identify constitutional
problems with, and willing to object to, legislation that—however normatively desirable—
exceeded Congress’s Section 5 powers to enforce Section 1, it would be Bingham. But
Bingham enthusiastically supported the Enforcement Act despite its protection of
unenumerated rights and despite the distinctions it drew between citizens and noncitizens.
Lash also provides no evidence that Bingham objected to the 1866 Act because it protected
unenumerated rights, and we have been unable to find any such evidence in the course of
our own research. See Lash, supra note 39, at 1394 (arguing that Bingham “objected that
Congress lacked power to enforce the rights of due process” and that he “also criticized
Congress’s failure to extend these rights to all persons”).
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D. Lash’s ERO Theory Was Not Widely Held by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Ratifiers
To sum up to this point: we lack confidence in the accuracy of Lash’s
account of Bingham’s decision to replace “the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states” with “the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States,” and regard Lash’s ERO interpretation of Howard’s introduction of the third draft to the Senate to be implausible and unconvincing.
Indeed, it seems to us that if Lash is right about the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, then Howard must have been either wrong or careless with his
speech when he included unenumerated rights in his “mass” of “privileges,
immunities, and rights” without making plain that he had only comity rights
in mind.
Given the weakness of Lash’s arguments that Bingham’s absolute-protection understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was idiosyncratic
and that his third draft was in fact a repudiation of it, we doubt that Howard
was wrong. And, given that, as Christopher Green has observed, Howard
“certainly explains himself more adequately than Bingham generally does,”
we doubt that Howard was careless with his speech.390
But Lash’s ERO theory is not yet doomed. “[C]ompetent speakers of
the English language who were aware of the context in which the text was communicated for ratification”391 might have gleaned an ERO understanding from coverage of congressional debates in the newspapers, arguments presented by
the Amendment’s supporters and opponents in the course of the ratification
fight, and statements in response to politically salient events. This Section
explores these materials.
As we summarized in Part I, Lash’s case for a shared ERO understanding
on the part of the public depends on “[n]ewspapers and political commentaries” that provided “a constant flow of information about the activities of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress”;392 Republican speeches and commentary in the late
summer of 1866; urgent Republican calls for adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the wake of state-sponsored murder of mostly black citizens
in New Orleans; President Johnson’s failed October counteramendment; and
continued Republican advocacy for the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake
of the Republican landslide victory in the November elections.
Early newspaper coverage of the congressional debates is not helpful to
Lash. Lash makes much of two facts: First, that Bingham’s various affirmations that the emerging amendment was designed to enforce the “bill of
rights” were widely reported. Second, that the “coverage of Jacob Howard’s
presentation to the Senate of the final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment
was wide and deep” and praised even by papers with a conservative bias as
390
391
392

Green, supra note 19, at 110.
LASH, supra note 28, at xiv (emphasis added).
Id. at 182.
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“clear and cogent.”393 We doubt that it can be inferred from this coverage
that readers understood the emerging amendment to protect only enumerated rights.
To begin with, recent scholarship has shown that the first eight or ten
amendments to the Constitution were not commonly referred to as “the Bill
of Rights” until well into the twentieth century.394 Indeed, the scattered references to these amendments as “the bill of rights” by Republicans at this
date is one of the very earliest applications of this label to the amendments.
As Professor Gerard Magliocca has shown, this usage would not begin to gain
steam until the debate over the acquisition of the Philippines in the late
1890s and the debate over Wilson-administration abuses of civil liberties in
the 1920s. It would not become standard public usage until Franklin
Roosevelt employed the label in defense of the constitutionality of the New
Deal.395
Indeed, it was not until 1952 that “the Bill of Rights” was ensconced in
the National Archives alongside the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution.396 Before 1938, the original published version of the amendments—which were not labeled “the Bill of Rights”—that now resides there
was hidden away in the basement of the State Department.397 Attributing
the post–New Deal meaning of “the Bill of Rights” to the pre–Fourteenth
Amendment public is anachronistic. (Although we admit it was an understandable mistake to have made before this recent revisionist scholarship.)
Bingham’s own usage during the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment is evidence that “the Bill of Rights” lacked a standard meaning. We
have seen that, at least early in the debates, Bingham used the “bill of rights”
to encompass the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2,
which he understood to protect unenumerated rights. Only years after ratification—in a speech that is unusual in several respects—did he expressly
exclude rights protected by Article IV from the “bill of rights.”398
Among other things, the term “bill of rights” was most commonly associated with a prefatory statement of natural and fundamental rights such as
found in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, authored by George Mason. A
portion of Mason’s formulation was later incorporated into Justice Washington’s summary of the privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several
393 Id. at 187–88 (quoting Editorial, The Reconstruction Committee’s Amendment in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1866, at 4).
394 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 85, at 6, 90; Michael J. Douma, How the First Ten Amendments Became the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 609–11 (2017) (finding that
“Bill of Rights” became defined as the first ten amendments by the late 1920s and early
1930s); Pauline Maier, The Strange History of the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497,
506–11 (2017) (finding that the “Bill of Rights” did not emerge as an icon until the 1930s).
395 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 85, at 6–7.
396 Id. at 147.
397 Id. at 100. From 1938 to 1952, the federal copy of the first twelve amendments was
housed at the National Archives, while the Declaration and Constitution were at the
Library of Congress. Id.
398 See LASH, supra note 28, at 185–86.
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states in Corfield. As Magliocca explains, the first ten amendments were not
thought to constitute a bill of rights because they did not resemble such
preambulatory affirmations of rights.399
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that, when Howard referred in his
speech to “the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution,”400 he did not label these amendments
“the Bill of Rights.” As we have already discussed, we do not agree that Howard’s speech is best read as expressing an ERO understanding. And Lash
acknowledges that at least one newspaper understood Howard to be referring only to rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.401 It is
wholly insufficient to say, as Lash does, that “the general idea of the amendment seemed to be getting through,” implying an ERO understanding as the
general idea, given the importance of the details.402
Early Republican advocacy during the summer of 1866 also affirmatively
undermines Lash’s case for a public ERO understanding. Lash notes that
“[a] number of Republicans expressly tied Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”403 By drawing a connection
between Section 1 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Republicans made it
more likely that members of the public would understand Section 1 to protect equality in the enjoyment of unenumerated rights to contract, property,
and security—protection that, it bears repeating, Lash cannot account for in
terms of the enforcement of an enumerated right to comity.
As they did in the course of congressional debates, Republicans denied
that Section 1 would enfranchise blacks, but they did not rely upon the
unenumerated status of the right to suffrage when doing so.404 Indeed, they
could hardly do so while simultaneously maintaining that Section 1 removed
doubts about the constitutionality of civil rights legislation that protected
399 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 85, at 67 (observing that the 1791 amendments “lacked the
formal traits of a bill of rights as understood since the Founding”).
400 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
401 LASH, supra note 28, at 189 & n.53.
402 Id. at 189. Lash is also mistaken to characterize Samuel Nicholas’s essay as postratification commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment. See S.S. Nicholas, A Brief Comment
on the Civil Rights Act, LOUISVILLE WKLY. COURIER, June 6, 1866, at 4, http://nyx.uky.edu/
dips/xt7ffb4wj40w/data/0050.pdf. The date of the article makes plain that Nicholas did
not, as Lash claims, “wr[ite] not long after Congress passed the amendment,” LASH, supra
note 28, at 154—the Amendment was not sent to the states until June 13. Indeed, the title
of the article suggests that Nicholas was not even discussing the amendment. Although
Bryan Wildenthal has argued that Nicholas may have been discussing both the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the amendment in the passage highlighted by Lash, Lash cannot fairly
assume without argument that Nicholas was doing so, or that Nicholas meant by “the bill of
rights” only enumerated rights. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509,
1593–94 (2007).
403 LASH, supra note 28, at 194.
404 Green, supra note 19, at 124 (“The enumerated-rights-only view of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was never offered during 1866 as an explanation why the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not apply to voting.”).
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unenumerated rights. Lash further acknowledges that Republicans frequently emphasized “equal rights” without “exploring the precise content of
those ‘equal’ rights,” even though it would have, on Lash’s account, been
easy for them to supply that content by communicating an ERO understanding, as well as politically useful in alleviating concerns about suffrage.405
Lash’s thorough examination of the activity of Southern Loyalists, and
Republican activists more generally, in the wake of the New Orleans massacre
yields persuasive evidence that the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, and freedom of peaceable assembly and petition were understood
by supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment to be among the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens. In particular, speeches made and resolutions
adopted by the Southern Loyalists’ Convention, hosted in Philadelphia on
September 3, 1866, expressed the view that the enumerated rights that had
been recently violated would be among the privileges and immunities protected by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.406
This evidence offers compelling support for the proposition that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was understood to protect certain enumerated rights. But it is entirely consistent with the proposition that unenumerated rights that could not “be fully defined in their entire extent and precise
nature”407 would also be protected by the Clause. That participants in the
Convention emphasized that particular enumerated rights would be secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment is understandable in the context of recent
assaults upon those rights. We cannot infer from this that they understood
the Amendment to secure only those rights, any more than we can infer from
them that they understood the Amendment to include all and only enumerated rights, as Lash claims.
This last point is crucially important. Lash adduces evidence from a variety of sources referring to particular enumerated rights. He codes some of
those references as evidence of a “common conception of the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment as guarding against state-sponsored abridgment of
constitutionally enumerated rights.”408 But one could just as well code them
as evidence of importantly different conceptions.
For example, Lash presents Texas Judge Lorenzo Sherwood’s address to
the Southern Loyalists’ Convention as evidence for the ERO theory:
We stand on the constitutional rights of the citizen; those rights specified
and enumerated in the great charter of American liberty, in the following
form—
“Security to Life, Person, and Property. Freedom of the Press; Freedom
of Opinion; and Freedom in the Exercise of Religion. Fair and impartial
Trial by Jury under such regulations as to make the administration of justice
complete. Unobstructed commerce between the States, and the right of the
citizens of each State to pass into and sojourn in any other State, and to
405 LASH, supra note 28, at 195–96.
406 Id. at 205.
407 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
408 LASH, supra note 28, at 208.
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enjoy the immunities and privileges of the citizens of such other State.
Exemption from any order of nobility or government through privileged
class: The guaranty of Republican Government to every State and to all the
People thereof, making the preservation and maintenance of the above enumerated rights, unless forfeited by crime, the constitutional test and definition of what is Republican Government.[”]409

We have here a motley assortment of enumerated rights, and perhaps
one unenumerated right—the Constitution does not enumerate a right to
“[s]ecurity to life, person and property,” only a right not to be “deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The references to enumerated rights are consistent with theories of the privileges and immunities
of citizenship that include some but not all of the rights enumerated in the
first eight amendments; theories that include both enumerated and
unenumerated rights; and Lash’s distinctive ERO theory. This is not much
help to Lash.
The same can be said for the “Appeal of the Loyal Men of the South to
their Fellow-Citizens of the United States” adopted midway through the
convention:
Statute books groaned under despotic laws against unlawful and insurrectionary assemblies, aimed at the constitutional guaranties of the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for a redress of grievances. It proscribed
democratic literature as incendiary, nullified constitutional guaranties of . . .
free speech and a free press. It deprived citizens of the other States of their
privileges and immunities in the States . . . .410

Lash describes the appeal as “specifically point[ing] to the states’ abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, such as
the rights of speech and press.”411 We agree that this is evidence that freedom of speech and of the press are among the privileges and immunities of
citizenship. It is not, however, evidence of “the common conception of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment as guarding against state-sponsored
abridgment of constitutionally enumerated rights.”412 As with Lorenzo’s
speech, it is consistent with a variety of theories of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship that hold that at least some enumerated rights are
protected—not evidence that lends support to Lash’s ERO theory in
particular.
These are not the only partial lists of enumerated rights that Lash collects, but they are representative. Such lists make it more likely that reasonably informed members of the public generally would have understood at least
some enumerated rights to be protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. But they do not make Lash’s distinctive theory that all enumerated
rights and only enumerated rights were understood to be protected by the
Clause more likely to be true.
409
410
411
412

The Southern Loyalists’ Convention, supra note 149, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 23.
LASH, supra note 28, at 206 (emphasis added).
Id. at 208.
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Lash also makes too much of President Johnson’s counteramendment.
Lash describes it as a “a passive restatement of Article IV’s Comity Clause”;413
touts it as evidence that Johnson found the language of Article IV
unthreatening;414 and claims that Johnson would certainly not have
endorsed language that he believed would be understood to protect substantive national rights.415 But Lash’s characterization of the counteramendment is inaccurate.
The counteramendment does not merely “restate[ ]” the language of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause—it alters it so as to implicitly repudiates the “ellipsis” theory propounded by Bingham. It does so by specifying
that the protected privileges and immunities belong to “citizens of the several
states” rather than to “citizens [of the United States] in the several states.”416
The effect is to tie the enjoyment of any privileges or immunities to state
rather than to national citizenship.
Further, Lash acknowledges but fails to appreciate fully the significance
of the fact that the amended language was “passive”—namely, that it did not
confer upon Congress the power to enforce it, any more than did Article
IV.417 Taken together, these differences are sufficient to explain Johnson’s
comfort with the counteramendment, irrespective of what he believed the
content of “privileges and immunities” to be.
Finally, postelection Republican advocacy—including advocacy highlighted by Lash—contradicts the ERO understanding. Consider the series of
letters published in the New York Times under the pseudonym “Madison.”
Madison apparently did not get the memo that Corfield listed rights that
attached to state rather than to national citizenship and that such rights
would be protected only against parochial discrimination by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. In the first letter, Madison wrote:
What the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States are, are
thus summed up in another case: Protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the rights to possess and acquire property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; the right to pass
through and reside in any other State, for the purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits or otherwise; to obtain the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the Courts of the
State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal, &c., &c.
These are the long-defined rights of a citizen of the United States, with
which States cannot constitutionally interfere.418
413 Id. at 221–22.
414 Id. at 223.
415 Id. at 222–23.
416 1 FLEMING, supra note 153, at 240 (emphasis added).
417 See LASH, supra note 28, at 223 (acknowledging that the provision would “do nothing at all” because it “omitted both the ‘no state shall’ language and a final section granting Congress power to enforce the Amendment”).
418 Madison, The National Question, supra note 148, at 2.
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This is an unambiguous affirmation that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will provide absolute protection to Corfield rights. It uses language
from Corfield. It groups enumerated and unenumerated rights together. It
describes all of those rights as “rights of a citizen of the United States.” It
does not recognize the alleged distinction between unenumerated natural
and common-law rights that were protected against parochial discrimination
by Article IV and enumerated national rights that were to be protected,
period, by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which Lash claims is the original public meaning of the term.
Above all, “[t]hese” rights do not look like comity rights. To read
Madison as allowing that states can “constitutionally interfere” with the
“rights of a citizen of the United States,” so long as they do not discriminate
against out-of-staters when doing so, is counterintuitive to say the least.
In the second letter, Madison reiterates that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause “is intended for the enforcement of the Second Section of the Fourth
Article of the Constitution” and proceeded to recite the language of the latter.419 Madison then referred readers to the first letter, stating that “[w]e
have seen . . . what privileges and immunities were intended.”420 After a
discussion of the import of the Due Process of Law and Equal Protection
Clauses and some disparagement of the “feeble” opposition, Madison concluded by declaring that the Amendment will be “coextensive with the whole
Bill of Rights in its reason and spirit.”421
Lash presents Madison’s claims that the Amendment is necessary to
enforce “the Bill of Rights”—claims made in numerous letters—as evidence
of an ERO understanding.422 But it is obvious in context that the author
understands “the Bill of Rights” to include a variety of unenumerated rights
associated with Article IV. We have here another example of the nonstandard use of that phrase before it became exclusively associated with the first
eight or ten amendments.
Lash’s treatment of Frederick Douglass’s January 1867 Atlantic essay is
similarly selective. Lash is certainly correct that Douglass “reminded readers
of how the South had suppressed free speech, free press, and the free exercise of religion.”423 But Professor James Fox has pointed out that Douglass
did much more, both in that essay and in a prior essay published in the Atlantic in December of 1866 in the immediate aftermath of the Republican victory.424 Douglass gave voice to an understanding of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship that was not exhausted by enumerated rights.
419 Madison, The Proposed Constitutional Amendment, supra note 148, at 2.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 LASH, supra note 28, at 217.
423 Id. at 216.
424 See James W. Fox Jr., Publics, Meanings & the Privileges of Citizenship, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 567, 597–99 (2015) (reviewing LASH, supra note 28) (showing that Douglass articulated “a very different view of the [1866] election and the structure and relationship of
rights than presented in [Lash’s book]”). Fox also criticizes Lash for narrowing the scope
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In portions of the January essay that Lash does not discuss, Douglass
condemned the “denial of political rights” as an instantiation of master-slave
ideology and describes suffrage as essential to citizenship.425 In the December essay, Douglass denied that the Constitution knew “any difference
between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States”; affirmed that
“[c]itizenship . . . includes all the rights of citizens, whether State or
national”; and argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed
that “a legal voter in any State shall be a legal voter in all the States.”426
To focus only on Douglass’s references to enumerated rights is to narrow the breadth of his constitutional arguments and to fail to come to grips
with the contestation concerning the nature of citizenship that was taking
place. This contestation makes the determinate public meaning for which
Lash contends still less likely.427
The rest of the evidence adduced by Lash consists of statements made by
governors and representatives during the ratification process. Some of these
identify particular enumerated rights as protected by the proposed amendment,428 and some affirm that all “constitutional rights” or “rights which the
Constitution provides” are protected.429 Once again, statements that particular enumerated rights are among protected privileges and immunities cannot
be taken to imply that only those rights, or only enumerated rights, are protected privileges and immunities, absent contextual enrichment that Lash
does not provide.
General statements that all “constitutional rights” or “rights which the
Constitution provides” underdetermine the question of enumeration. We
have just seen that Madison understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause
to protect those unenumerated rights “provide[d]” by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, to which he or she referred as “the whole
Bill of Rights.” To claim that these statements reflected an understanding of
the “ ‘textualist nature’ of the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the
of Victoria Woodhull’s constitutional claims and privileging the “legalistic arguments of
her counsel.” Id. at 600–04.
425 Douglass, supra note 150, at 117.
426 Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1866, at 761, 765.
427 While Douglass ultimately opposed the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it
did not secure voting rights, it is clear from Douglass’s discussion of Article IV and his
denial that there was “any difference between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the
United States” that Douglass did believe that voting rights were among the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens. Id. It was the contradiction between Section 1’s promise of
citizenship and Section 2, which plainly contemplated that southern states could deny voting rights, so long as they were willing to pay a stipulated penalty, that inspired Douglass to
oppose the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Douglass stated: “[T]o tell me that I am an
equal American citizen, and, in the same breath, tell me that my right to vote may be
constitutionally taken from me . . . , is to tell me that my citizenship is but an empty name.”
Frederick Douglass, Letter to the Editor, Letter from Frederick Douglass, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY
STANDARD, July 7, 1866, at 2.
428 LASH, supra note 28, at 218–19.
429 Id. at 220 (emphasis omitted) (first quoting PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE RECORD, app.
at LVI (1867); and then quoting id. at XCIX).
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United States’ ”430 is to raise the further question of whether those who made
them understood the existing constitutional text as Lash does. Lash does not
answer that question.
Thus, we have a mass of evidence that certain enumerated rights—most
prominently the rights to freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceable
assembly—were publicly understood to be protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause; some evidence that unenumerated rights were publicly
understood to be protected; and no evidence that all and only enumerated
rights were understood to be protected.
Lash is correct that none of the Amendment’s supporters “described the
Amendment as nationalizing the subject of civil rights in the states, and many
described the Amendment as requiring the states to protect rights listed in
[what we now call] the Bill of Rights, especially speech and assembly.”431 But
a number of the Amendment’s supporters did describe it as protecting
unenumerated rights—whether by cementing the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 or by authorizing Congress and the federal courts to
prevent states from violating Corfield rights. And no supporters denied that it
would do so, even though the ERO theory might have aided the Amendment’s “painfully slow movement toward ratification.”432
E. Postratification Evidence Does Not Support the ERO Understanding
We are surprised in two respects by the postratification evidence curated
by Lash. First, we are surprised that Lash interprets this evidence as being
generally consistent with his ERO theory. Second, we are surprised that Lash
neglects a wealth of other evidence from the same timeframe, which suggests
that the ERO understanding did not take hold.
We will begin by conceding that what Lash offers as the best piece of
evidence in favor of his position does in fact offer some support for it. That
evidence is John Bingham’s March 31, 1871, account of the constitutional
thought behind the third draft of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, delivered in defense of the proposed Ku Klux Klan Act.
Lash is correct about this: Bingham praised Barron as correctly decided
and needing to be reversed by a properly worded amendment; stated that the
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” are “chiefly
defined in the first eight amendments,” which he went on to quote in their
entirety; and most significantly described the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause as “other and different” than the “civil rights”
that Corfield held that states “could not refuse to extend to citizens of other
States.”433
Bingham seems also to be denying that the “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” effectively nationalized Corfield rights. It is diffi430
431
432
433

Id.
Id. at 221.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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cult to read this account as anything other than a denial that the set of rights
protected by Article IV is identical to the set of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
On the other hand, this speech offers no support for Lash’s current view
that the Privileges or Immunities of U.S. citizens extends to enumerated
rights beyond those in the first eight amendments.434 Bingham here speaks only of
the first eight amendments. There is, therefore, nothing in this speech that
supports Lash’s current claim that Bingham (or anyone else) viewed the
comity-only reading of Article IV as an additional enumerated right.
Perhaps, however, we should not overread this speech—the only speech
presented by Lash in which one of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly denies that Corfield rights are among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship.435 To say, as Bingham does, that privileges or
immunities are “chiefly defined” in the first eight amendments is to imply that
they are not entirely defined in the first eight amendments.436 Indeed, a few
moments later, as Christopher Green points out,437 Bingham himself offered
the following caveat about his preceding remarks: “[I]n this discussion I
have . . . referred only incidentally to the provisions of the Constitution guarantying rights, privileges, and immunities to citizens of the United States.”438
Bingham then asked “the House, when they come to deliberate upon
this question, not to forget the imperishable words of our great Declaration
[of Independence], ‘All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with the rights of life and liberty.’ ”439 He also asked “gentlemen not to
forget those other words of the Declaration, that ‘to protect [sic] these
rights’ (not to confer them) ‘governments are instituted among men.’ ”440
Then, just after this clear affirmation of natural rights, Bingham sings
the praises of the unenumerated “liberty . . . to work in an honest calling and
contribute by your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to the support
of your fellow-men, and to be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of your
toil.”441 And, lest we jump to the conclusion that he was here referring to
some comity-only-protected natural rights, or rights protected only by the
due process of law, Bingham equated these unenumerated liberties with “the
right ‘to know, to argue, and to utter freely according to conscience’ ”442—
natural rights that are protected by the First Amendment.
434 See Lash, supra note 34, at 460 (stating that he was “no longer convinced” that Bingham understood the Clause to “nationalize[ ] more rights tha[n] those listed in the first
eight amendments”).
435 It is the also only congressional speech cited by Lash in which the Establishment
Clause is included in a partial list of protected privileges and immunities of citizenship.
436 Green, supra note 19, at 134 (emphasis added).
437 Id.
438 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
439 Id.
440 Id. (emphasis added). The Declaration uses “secure,” not “protect.”
441 Id.
442 Id.
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At best, if Bingham’s 1871 speech is not contradictory, then it is ambiguous. But that is not all. Bingham’s Woodhull Report on women’s suffrage—
issued just two months previous—plainly affirms that the set of rights protected by Article IV is identical to the set of rights protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Lash’s dismissal of the Woodhull Report is
unsatisfactory.443
Suppose we grant that Bingham’s subsequent speech is a more credible
expression of his own personal understanding of the Clause than his Woodhull Report, irrespective of whether anyone else shared it. It remains striking
that neither the majority of committee members who signed onto the Woodhull Report, nor the minority who opposed it, endorsed the ERO theory,
even though they disagreed about which rights the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protected. Six of these ten committee members were members of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress;444 two were elected to office in November of 1866.445
In short, the Woodhull Report makes Lash’s interpretation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause less likely.
Unsatisfactory, too, is Lash’s failure in his book to discuss Howard’s postratification commentary on the Clause, given Lash’s (justified, in our view)
reliance upon Howard as a credible source of interpretive information. On
February 8, 1869, Howard rebutted Republican arguments—advanced by
Senators Charles Sumner and George Edmunds—that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause secured voting rights as follows:
The occasion of introducing the first section of the fourteenth article of
amendment into that amendment grew out of the fact that there was nothing in the whole Constitution to secure absolutely the citizens of the United
States in the various States against an infringement of their rights and privileges
under the second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution. That section
declares that—
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”
There it was plainly written down. Now, sir, it seems to me, that unless
the Senator from Vermont and the Senator from Massachusetts can derive the
right of voting from this ancient second section of the fourth article upon the ground
that the citizens of each State are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, they must give up the argument; and I assert here with
confidence that no such construction was ever given to the second section of
the fourth article of the Constitution.446
443 In a trial, Bingham’s Woodhull Report would be considered a prior inconsistent
statement that could be used to impeach the credibility of his later claim.
444 Specifically, John Bingham, Burton Cook, Charles Eldridge, Giles Hotchkiss,
Michael Kerr, and Ulysses Mercur. JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–2005, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-222, at 170–73 (2005),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222/pdf/GPO-CDOC-108
hdoc222.pdf.
445 Specifically, Benjamin Butler and William Loughridge. See id. at 174–77.
446 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphases added).
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Had Howard held an ERO understanding, it would have been easy for
him to simply state that the right of voting was unenumerated and thus
unprotected against invidious discrimination. Given that he did not do so,
we think he is best read as arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to “secure absolutely” the “rights and privileges” protected merely
against parochial discrimination by Article IV against all invidious state discrimination. Accordingly, the right of voting is not thus secured because it is
not among those “rights and privileges.”
It is also clear that Howard did not agree with Bingham’s sharp distinction between the rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and those protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. So, even if we
grant that Lash has read Bingham’s 1871 speech correctly, there appears to
be a postratification conflict between Bingham and Howard that Lash simply
does not address.447
Turning now to postratification caselaw, Lash begins his study with two
decisions: Garnes v. McCann and Live-Stock Dealers. In Garnes, the Ohio
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade
segregated schools.448 Lash reads Judge Luther Day’s opinion for the court
in Garnes as “reject[ing] the effort to interpret the [Privileges or Immunities]
Clause as protecting unenumerated rights.”449 Lash excerpts the following
language:
We are not aware that this has been as yet judicially settled. The language of
the clause, however, taken in connection with other provisions of the
amendment, and of the constitution of which it forms a part, affords strong
reasons for believing that it includes only such privileges or immunities as
are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the United States. A
broader interpretation opens into a field of conjecture limitless as the range
of speculative theories, and might work such limitations of the power of the
447 In a blog post, Lash interpreted Howard to be arguing that “[i]f the Comity Clause
did not provide that right to anyone (visitor or resident), then neither did the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Kurt Lash, More than Equality, Less than Federalizing the Common Law: A
Response to Christopher Green, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.originalism
blog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2014/11/more-than-equality-less-than-federaliz
ing-the-common-law-a-response-to-christopher-green-kurt-lash.html. It is not clear why
Howard would have deployed such an argument against Sumner and Edmunds, who were
not arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected the right to vote against
merely parochial discrimination but, rather, against all invidious state discrimination. See
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (arguing that
a constitutional amendment “conceded to the States the power to discriminate against
colored persons” when regulating the qualifications of voters “would not have passed the
Senate had anybody attributed to it that meaning”); id. at 1002 (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (arguing that “it is one of the essential privileges of citizenship . . . to vote, to
exercise political power” and implying that any state constitutional clause that “limits the
right to vote to persons of a particular race” is “swept away” by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
448 State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871).
449 LASH, supra note 28, at 232.
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States to manage and regulate their local institutions and affairs as were
never contemplated by the amendment.450

This language does not support Lash’s thesis. First, Judge Day is more
tentative than one would expect, if indeed the ERO theory of “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States” was widely held. He offers only
“strong reasons” for his interpretation of the language, as if it were not obvious that the claimed right was unprotected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Second, for reasons that we have repeated, general statements to the
effect that the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens must be “derived
from” the Constitution are ambiguous as to whether those rights must be
enumerated in the sense claimed by Lash. At best, Garnes does not contradict Lash’s account. It does not make that account more likely to be true.
In contrast, Justice Bradley’s opinion in Live-Stock Dealers clearly contradicts Lash’s account. Lash emphasizes Bradley’s claim that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause “embraces much more” than the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the latter only prohibited states from “discriminating in favor of [their] own citizens, and against the citizens of other
states.”451 But in the very next paragraph after the language excerpted by
Lash, Justice Bradley equates the rights protected by the two clauses and
implies that they may not all be enumerated:
What, then, are the essential privileges which belong to a citizen of the
United States, as such, and which a state cannot by its laws invade? It may be
difficult to enumerate or define them. The supreme court, on one occasion,
thought it unwise to do so. 18 How. 591.452

The citation is to Conner v. Elliot,453 in which the Court discussed, but provided no definitive interpretation of, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.454
Worse still for Lash, Bradley goes on to identify the unenumerated “privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow . . . lawful industrial
pursuit[s]” alongside the enumerated rights to due process of law and equal
protection of the laws as privileges without indicating that enumeration has
any significance.455 It is the fact that these privileges “cannot be invaded
without sapping the very foundations of republican government” that, for
Justice Bradley, identifies them as “essential” and therefore protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.456

450 Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 209–10.
451 Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
452 Id. (emphasis added).
453 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856).
454 Id. at 593.
455 Live-Stock Dealers, 15 F. Cas. at 652.
456 Id.
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We have examined every decision prior to the Slaughter-House Cases in
which the Privileges or Immunities Clause was discussed.457 We have found
no case in which a court expressly distinguished the set of rights protected by
the Privileges or Immunities Clause from those protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. We have found no case in which a court expressly
endorsed Lash’s ERO theory. We have found no case in which a court
expressly rejected the proposition that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects unenumerated rights.
To the contrary, we have found numerous cases in which courts
endorsed the latter proposition, including not only Live-Stock Dealers but also
the following:
•

Burns v. State: the “rights conferred by citizenship” include the right of
“suing any other citizen” and “the right to make and enforce contracts,
amongst which is that of marriage with any citizen capable of entering
into that relation”;458

•

United States v. Hall: in which future Supreme Court Justice William
Woods identified privileges or immunities as “those which may be
denominated fundamental,” citing Corfield;459

•

In re Hobbs: stating that “[a]ny attempt . . . to enumerate or describe the
fundamental rights” secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
“would give but an unsatisfactory result”;460 and

•

Van Valkenburg v. Brown: privileges and immunities include “the enjoyment of life and liberty, and the right to acquire and possess property,
and to demand and receive the protection of the Government in aid of
these,” as well as “the right to sue and defend in the Courts, to have the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and an exemption from higher taxes
or heavier impositions than were to be borne by other persons under like
conditions and circumstances.”461

Given the scope of his research, Lash’s failure to discuss the myriad authorities that rejected his position in the pre-Slaughter-House caselaw is hard to
understand.
This brings us to Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court in the SlaughterHouse Cases, which Lash presents as a badly misunderstood affirmation of an
ERO understanding. Lash is not alone in this revisionist view of Miller’s
457 These cases include In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 6550);
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282); Live-Stock Dealers, 15 F.
Cas. 649; Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872); Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43 (1872); Ex
parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702 (1869); State v. Stanton’s Liquors, 38 Conn. 233 (1871); White v.
Clements, 39 Ga. 232 (1869); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661
(1873); Minor v. Happersett, 53 Mo. 58 (1873); and Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871).
458 Burns, 48 Ala. at 198.
459 Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 81. Woods included “among” these rights “those which in the
constitution are expressly secured to the people, either as against the action of the federal
or state governments,” such as “the right of freedom of speech, and the right peaceably to
assemble.” Id.
460 See In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. at 264.
461 Van Valkenburg, 43 Cal. at 48.
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opinion. Now-Judge Kevin Newsom defended a similar view.462 So has Professor Bryan Wildenthal.463
We do not find the revisionist view persuasive. Most of the specific rights
that Justice Miller mentions in his opinion for the Court are based on citizens’ interactions with the federal government.464 The references to petition,
assembly, and habeas are sandwiched between the right to protection by the
federal government when traveling on the high seas or within the protection
of a foreign government, the right to use the navigable waters of the United
States, and the right to enjoy rights that have been recognized in treaties.465
Only then does Justice Miller acknowledge that there “may be” rights protected by the Clause that are clearly good against the states—such as those
specified in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.466
The contrast between this language and Justice Bradley’s unequivocal
affirmations in dissent that a wide range of enumerated rights are protected
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause against state interference467 is stark.
Justice Miller’s omission to acknowledge this point of alleged partial agreement with Bradley cries out for an explanation that Lash does not provide.468
We thus find it unsurprising that the Court in Cruikshank did not see any
inconsistency between the reasoning of Slaughter-House and its own conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected only the right to petition Congress.469
Turning, finally, to Lash’s postratification commentary on the Clause, we
again find that Lash overstates his case for consistency. It is true, as Lash
claims, that John Norton Pomeroy, Timothy Farrar, and George Paschal all
interpreted Section 1 as overturning Barron.470 But these commentators also
said things that are either in tension with, or outright contradict, Lash’s ERO
theory.
Farrar identified the set of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause with the set protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
and included among privileges and immunities those federally unenumerated rights specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Farrar affirmed that
Article IV “ ‘privileges and immunities,’ whether originally natural, personal,
or common-law rights, or civil and political rights” are now “legal rights
462 Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting lncorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000).
463 Bryan H. Wildenthal, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Slaughter-House
Cases: An Essay in Constitutional-Historical Revisionism, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 241 (2001).
464 See James W. Fox Jr., Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 78–79 (2002).
465 Id. at 78; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79–80 (1873).
466 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80.
467 Id. at 118–19 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (listing rights “specified in the original Constitution, or in the early amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities” of U.S.
citizenship).
468 Fox, supra note 464, at 80.
469 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
470 LASH, supra note 28 at 273–74.
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secured by the Constitution to every citizen of the United States,” citing “Am.
14, § 1.”471 Pomeroy opined that the “broad, general principle of interpretation” adopted by the Slaughter-House dissenters was “correct” and predicted
(incorrectly) that it would “in time be universally accepted.”472
Paschal’s view appears closest to Lash’s ERO theory. He took a comityonly view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; stated that Section 1
“impose[s] upon the States” those “general principles, which had been construed to apply only to the national government”; and stated that those principles are embodied in the “guarant[ees]” of both the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and “the thirteen amendments.”473 Yet, this is awfully
nonspecific language, and Paschal’s subsequent praise for Justice Stephen
Field’s “very able” dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases raises questions about
how broad Paschal understood those “general principles” to be.474
Finally, we are surprised that Lash does not discuss the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 at any length.475 It’s true that the further one gets from ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the less probative interpretation of constitutional provisions is of original understanding. Memories fade; political possibilities change; the expected costs to legislators of misrepresenting the
meaning of constitutional clauses declines with the likelihood of detection;
and departure from original meaning becomes less likely to be detected as
time passes.
But, the four-year evolution of the Act from an initial proposed amendment to legislation that allowed former Confederates to serve in office into a
stand-alone bill spans the postratification period canvassed by Lash. His failure to consider what legislators had to say about privileges, immunities, and
citizenship in connection with it during that time frame seems to demand an
explanation, which Lash does not provide.
471 See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 199 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1872); see also id. at 200 (stating that “on
the 9th of April, 1866, a statute was enacted for executing [the Privileges and Immunities
Clause]”).
472 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 256e, at 178 (Cambridge, The Riverside Press, 9th ed. 1886).
473 GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 290 (Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1868).
474 GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED 488 (Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison, 2d ed. 1876).
475 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. Section 1 of the Act provided that
all persons . . . shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of
every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Id. § 1. Section 4 forbade racial discrimination in jury service. Id. § 4. Section 1 was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); section
4 was upheld in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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We think that it is probative of the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that Republicans overwhelmingly relied upon an interpretation of it that included unenumerated rights;476 that they did so when arguing for and against the constitutionality of provisions of the evolving Act that
guaranteed nondiscrimination in common carriers, places of public accommodation, public schooling, and jury selection;477 and that only Democrats
who opposed the Act relied upon something resembling Lash’s ERO theory
of the Clause.478
It is of course possible that the Act’s supporters were wrong on the constitutional merits—although we do not think that they were.479 It is also true
that not all Republicans supported the Act—notable exceptions include Senators Lyman Trumbull, Matthew Carpenter, Orris Ferry, and Lot Morrill.480
But even those Republicans who had constitutional misgivings about various
incarnations of the Act did not make arguments from enumeration.
That the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed the enjoyment of
unenumerated civil rights associated with citizenship was common ground
for Republicans.481 Differences concerned whether particular rights that
476 At least, until the Slaughter-House Cases came down, at which point some of them
shifted to the Equal Protection Clause. See CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP,
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 98–99 (2015) (discussing this move).
477 The public schooling provisions were included in Senator Charles Sumner’s initial
proposal. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870) (statement of Sen. Sumner)
(explaining that the proposal would “secure equal rights in railroads, steamboats, public
conveyances, hotels, licensed theaters, houses of public entertainment, common schools,
and institutions of learning authorized by law, church institutions, and cemetery associations incorporated by national or State authority; also on juries in courts, national and
State”).
478 See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 342–43 (1874) (statement of Rep. Beck); 2 CONG. REC. app. at
233–44 (1874) (statement of Sen. Norwood); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at
25–26 (1872) (statement of Sen. Thurman).
479 We will elaborate our position in a subsequent work.
480 Carpenter objected to a provision that forbade racial discrimination in jury selection; Ferry, Morrill, and Trumbull objected to the entire Act. An earlier version of the Act
forbade discrimination in public schools—Ferry, Morrill, and Trumbull objected to this
provision for different reasons than they objected to the common-carrier and public
accommodation provisions. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1029–43 (1995). In brief, the latter three Republicans either
conceded that rights of nondiscriminatory access to common carriers and public accommodations were civil rights but denied that federal intervention was necessary to protect
them or questioned whether inns, theaters, and places of public amusement—all specified
in the Act—were really places of public accommodation. By contrast, they denied that
nondiscriminatory access to public schools was a civil right at all.
481 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (asserting that “civil rights” belonging to citizens include “right to go and come; the
right to enforce contracts; the right to convey his property; the right to buy property” and
other “common law right[s], regarded as a right appertaining to the individual as a citizen”); id. at 843–45 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (stating that privileges of citizenship
include those that “belong to American citizens, under the common law, which prevails all
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were to be secured by the Act were in fact “civil rights” that Congress had the
constitutional authority to protect, as well as whether it was necessary for
Congress to protect them.482
If Lash’s ERO theory were correct, it would seem that all of these Republicans were confused about the basic nature of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause—which seems extraordinarily unlikely. It should give him pause that
the only advocates of an ERO theory were members of the party that opposed
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in the first place and who had compelling political incentives to abridge its scope as much as possible to thwart
civil rights legislation. With friends like these, Lash’s ERO theory becomes
still less plausible as an interpretation of the Amendment’s original meaning.
We do not offer here a theory of the discount rate that should be used in
assessing the credibility of postratification evidence.483 It is clear, however,
that evidence generated during the postratification period does not make
Lash’s interpretation of the Clause more likely to be true. There is little evidence that the ratified language was understood by most Republicans or by
courts and commentators during this timeframe to protect only enumerated
rights and much evidence that suggests otherwise.
The only unambiguous advocacy of an ERO theory during this
timeframe appears to have come from Democratic opponents of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, upon whom Lash is understandably loath to rely for credible interpretations of an amendment that they opposed, or for credible
claims concerning the authority it provided for legislation they also opposed.
This is not good company for Lash to keep, and he wisely declines to do so.

over this country, inherited from England” including common-carrier access and the
“‘immunities of citizens’ . . . defined” in the 1866 Civil Rights Act (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1)); id. at 762 (statement of Sen. Carpenter) (including “the privilege of
practicing law, if a man can meet the test and pass the necessary examination in the courts;
the right of preaching the gospel, if employed and settled according to the usages of any
particular church; the right of giving instruction in the public schools” among the “privileges of an American citizen” protected “under the fourteenth amendment”); CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 4 (1872) (statement of Sen. Morrill) (privileges and
immunities are “those common privileges which one community accords to another in
civilized life”).
482 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 827 (1872) (statement of Sen. Carpenter) (describing right to sit on jury as a federally unprotectable “political right[ ]”); id. at
3190–91 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (denying that the right to go to school is a federally
protectable “civil right”); id. at 3257 (statement of Sen. Ferry) (acknowledging that black
citizens have a “right” not to be excluded from inns, theaters, or common carriers but
denying that segregated public schools present constitutional concerns); CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 4 (1872) (statement of Sen. Morrill) (privileges and immunities
include those specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and rights of access to common
carriers but not rights of access to theaters and inns).
483 We will stipulate that it ought not be zero.
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F. Lash’s Pessimism About the Enactment of an Unenumerated-Rights-Protective
Amendment Is Unwarranted
Lash is relentlessly bearish about the prospects of any amendment that
was understood to protect unenumerated rights being proposed and ratified
during the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Again484 and again,485 he denies that
moderates and conservatives would have signed off on a Privileges or Immunities Clause that would “nationalize natural and common law civil rights in
the states.”486 Lash repeatedly insists that radicals who might have hoped for
the latter simply did not have the votes.
We agree that the Thirty-Ninth Congress would not likely have proposed
an amendment that was widely understood to leave the specification of “privileges or immunities” entirely to Congress, owing to widespread Republican
attachment to some version of federalism, fear of a future Democratic Congress, and deep, widespread racism within both northern and southern society.487 But Lash offers no compelling reason to believe that a proposed
amendment that was understood to protect some unenumerated rights that
had been long and widely deemed fundamental to U.S. citizenship would
have met the same fate.
This was not, after all, a Congress that was unprepared to enact legislation
that expressly covered such unenumerated rights. The Civil Rights Act of
1866 expressly protected unenumerated rights, and Lash acknowledges that
numerous Republicans affirmed during the ratification process that Section
1 would secure the Civil Rights Act’s constitutionality.
We agree with Lash that evolution of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from
an initial proposal that generally forbade “discrimination in civil rights or
immunities”488 to a final text which specified only particular citizenship
rights was in part the product of Republican concerns about the preservation
of federalism.489 But its final text discloses a Republican consensus concerning the need to protect certain fundamental rights associated with citizenship—federalism concerns notwithstanding—whether or not constitutionally
enumerated.
Lash might respond that a Congress prepared to enact legislation that
protected unenumerated rights against state discrimination might not have
484 LASH, supra note 28, at 104 (“[Bingham’s initial draft] had nothing to do with radical efforts to nationalize the countless common law and natural rights traditionally regulated by the states.”).
485 Id. at 285 (“[M]oderates opposed on federalist grounds any effort to nationalize the
substance of civil rights in the states.”).
486 Id. at 78.
487 See Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 417, 419 (1986) (acknowledging “extreme racism” in the
North but emphasizing that while “economic and social conditions for northern blacks
were generally deplorable,” there was “a clear trend in the direction of granting greater
legal rights and protections to free blacks”).
488 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866).
489 See Lash, supra note 39, at 1430–34.
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been prepared to constitutionalize absolute protection for those same rights.
Such a response, however, would be unpersuasive. Although the 1866 Act
has accurately been described as antidiscrimination legislation, it effectively
secured absolute protection for fundamental rights belonging to all citizens
by using the rights enjoyed by white citizens as a standard. The Act’s language—“as is enjoyed by white citizens”—contemplates that whites were generally enjoying the specified rights and presumably would continue to do
so.490 If the Act does not expressly forbid states from denying those rights to
all citizens—whites and blacks alike—that particular possibility was deemed
remote.491
Therefore, whatever qualms Republicans allegedly had about protecting
these rights absolutely would have attached as well to the formulation that
was actually enacted. If there was any reason to think that those who believed
that the Act was constitutional also believed that there was a constitutionally
salient distinction between forbidding discrimination with respect to the
listed rights, on the one hand, and absolutely protecting them, on the other,
Lash does not offer it.
More generally, Lash’s argument appears to rest upon unwarranted confidence in his capacity to specify the range of possible outcomes of a highly
complex collective decision-making process. According to Lash, if an
amendment that gave Congress and the federal courts a blank check to
define and protect unenumerated rights would have been rejected, then any
amendment that succeeded must have been understood to exclude
unenumerated rights entirely.
That Lash’s conclusion does not follow from his premise may be illustrated by a hypothetical. Suppose, counterfactually, that Bingham emerged
from his deliberations with a version of Section 1 containing the language in
brackets:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge [any
rights of citizens of the United States that are expressly enumerated in the
text of the Constitution of the United States]; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.492

490 The phrase “as is enjoyed by white citizens” was added by James Wilson, who
explained that “it was thought by some persons that unless these qualifying words were
incorporated in the bill, those rights might be extended to all citizens, whether male or
female, majors or minors.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 157 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis added). The explanation suggests that he did not understand the change to transform the Act in any significant way; the lack of comment suggests
that no one else did.
491 See MALTZ, supra note 19, at 67 (describing it as “so farfetched that no speaker even
considered it”).
492 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (modified hypothetically).
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We think it plausible that this hypothetical Section 1—a more specific
articulation of what Lash understands the enacted Section 1 to mean—would
have been defeated. Democrats, of course, would have opposed it, as they
would have opposed any proposed amendment. We suspect that not only
radicals but even moderate Republicans would have opposed it because it
would not clearly secure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Obviously, an enumerated-rights-only Privileges or Immunities Clause would
not have secured the Act’s constitutionality, and Lash has not developed a
persuasive theory of how the original meaning of the Due Process of Law,
Equal Protection, or Citizenship Clauses would have done so. Of course,
given that this is a counterfactual, it is difficult to say.
If the above hypothetical amendment would have been defeated, then
does it follow logically that the enacted amendment must have afforded absolute protection to unenumerated rights or safeguarded citizens against otherthan-parochial discrimination? It does not. The enacted amendment may
have been underdeterminate as to some or all of those questions, in the
sense that there may be no one answer to them in which the ratifiers would
have placed a higher credence than any other.493 Underdeterminacy, in
turn, may have resulted from a failure on the part of the framers to reach
agreement concerning them and the failure of subsequent public debate to
produce such agreement.
In future work, we will argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did
clearly authorize Congress and the federal courts to protect enumerated and
unenumerated civil rights that shared a family resemblance. At the same
time, it did not confer upon Congress plenary power to regulate the full panoply of these rights. For his argument-from-implausibility to work, Lash
needs to show that an amendment that threaded this needle would likely
have not made it through the relevant veto gates. This he does not do.
Instead he relies—as did Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases—
upon tendentious characterizations of unenumerated-rights-protective theories of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as effectively turning Congress
into a “perpetual censor” upon all state legislation and expressing doubt that
such a Clause could have been ratified. We share his doubts on that score.
But we have similar doubts about a differently worded amendment that
clearly embodied his ERO theory.
We also doubt that—assuming his account of the political dynamics is
accurate—a Due Process of Law Clause that empowered the federal courts
and Congress to secure people’s natural rights through such means as the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 would be seen as any less threatening to “moderate”
Republicans than a Privileges or Immunities Clause that absolutely protected
the kinds of rights of citizenship listed by Justice Washington in Corfield.
493 Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing determinacy, indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy). In brief, the constitutional text is underdeterminate with respect to a given question “if and only if the set of results . . . that can be squared with the legal materials is a
nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.” Id.
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Given these doubts, Lash’s argument-from-implausibility fails.
CONCLUSION
We would not blame readers for being disappointed in our conclusion
that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is considerably more complicated than Kurt Lash makes it out to be. The pull of parsimony is strong. And Lash’s account of the Clause’s meaning—enumerated
rights and nothing but494—seems to promise originalists who are concerned
about the abuse of judicial discretion that they can have their original meaning and eat their judicial restraint, too.
Alas, this promise is false. Despite its appeal, it should not be adopted,
either by scholars and citizens who seek a comprehensive understanding of
the Clause’s original meaning, or by public officials who are oath-bound to
interpret and implement the Clause.
We are aware that it takes a theory to beat a theory, and that we have
only begun to sketch one of our own.495 We urge those who are skeptical of
unenumerated rights to bear with us. As Justice Clarence Thomas put it
when calling for the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s revival in his landmark
concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago496:
The mere fact that the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause does not expressly
list the rights it protects does not render it incapable of principled judicial
application. The Constitution contains many provisions that require an
examination of more than just constitutional text to determine whether a
particular act is within Congress’ power or is otherwise prohibited. . . . To be
sure, interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause may produce hard
questions. But they will have the advantage of being questions the Constitution asks us to answer.497

The Privileges or Immunities Clause raised hard questions that led even
those present at its enactment to speak of its “euphony and indefiniteness of
meaning”498 and to express uncertainty about its “effect.”499 Kurt Lash’s dili494 See Green, supra note 18 (reviewing Lash’s book). Lash objects to the “incorporationist” label, and so we do not apply it. See Lash, supra note 447 (objecting that the term
suggests that Lash holds Justice Hugo Black’s view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
“protects nothing more than the rights of the first eight amendments”). We, too, reject
“incorporation” as an unhelpful way of conceiving of the panoply of fundamental rights
protected from abridgment by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
495 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (2d ed. 1970)
(observing that “once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared
invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place”). Kuhn’s central point
is that “anomalies abound in all theories, but we are prepared to live with them if we find
the theory to be more useful than the best alternative.” Ray Ball, The Global Financial Crisis
and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have We Learned?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2009, at
8, 12.
496 561 U.S. 742, 805–58 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
497 Id. at 854–55.
498 2 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, 2 REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 41–42
(1902) (writing that the Clauses’s “euphony and indefiniteness of meaning was a charm to
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gent research and serious engagement with these questions has borne tremendous fruit that we have been able to gather at a considerably lower cost
than we might have otherwise incurred, thanks to his assiduous efforts, for
which we sincerely commend him. We have learned much even from what
we have concluded are his mistakes. We will bring to bear more of what we
have learned when we present an interpretation that better fits the available
evidence.
But, in the end, we must side with Jacob Howard.

[Bingham]”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard) (stating that the privileges and immunities of citizenship “are not and cannot be fully defined
in their entire extent and precise nature”). For evidence of postratification uncertainty,
see, for example, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1871) (statement of Sen. Pool)
(acknowledging that the “[t]he full scope of the rights incident to citizenship may not be
easy to define” and looking to English common law for guidance); CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (observing that “[t]here may be
sometimes great dispute and doubt as to what is the right, immunity, or privilege conferred
upon a citizen of the United States”); 3 CONG. REC. 1870 (1875) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (admitting that “it may be that you cannot make a precise definition” of the
privileges or immunities of citizenship but affirming that “what belongs to a man in his
character as a citizen has been long in a great many respects well understood”).
499 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson)
(objecting to and moving to redact the Privileges or Immunities Clause because of his
uncertainty about its “effect”). The lone Democrat on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Senator Reverdy Johnson was “[a] noted constitutional authority” who “remained a
respected figure in the Senate.” Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 957 (1984).
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